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

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


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
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

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
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THOMAS W. LUDLOW,

No. 244 East 13th St.,

NEW YORK, 25 JUN 1882

ON

ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS:

BKS. I, II, III, IV, X,

BY

J. M. HOPPIN, JR.,

B. A., Christ Church, Oxford.

NEW YORK:

A. G. SHERWOOD & CO., PRINTERS, 76 E. NINTH STREET.

1882.

Compliments of

J. M. Hoppin, Jr.,

47 Hillhouse Avenue,

New Haven, Connecticut.

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ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS:

Bks. I, II, III, IV, X.

SHOW HOW ARISTOTLE ARRIVES AT HIS DEFINITION OF
MORAL VIRTUE.

ἔξις προαιρετικὴ ἐν μεσότητι οὕσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς,
ῥοισμένη λόγῳ, καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὀρίσειεν.

Bk. II. 6.

ἔξις is explained in Ch. 5. Since all the attributes of the Soul are πάθη, δυνάμεις, ἔξεις, and as virtue cannot (for reasons assigned) be either πάθος or δύναμις, we obtain ἔξις as its proper genus.

NOT πάθη.

- (1.) We do not apply the terms *right and wrong, praise and blame*, to πάθη, as we obviously do to virtue.
- (2.) There is no προαίρεσις in πάθη, but there is in virtue.
- (3.) We are said to be *moved* [κινεῖσθαι] by πάθη, but to be in "some way *disposed*" [διακεῖσθαι πῶς] by virtue, and this difference in language implies a difference in fact.

NOT δύναμις.

- (1.) As in the case of πάθη, we do not apply the terms *right and wrong, praise and blame*, to δυνάμεις.
 - (2.) δυνάμεις come by *nature*, and virtue does not.
- Ergo, if virtue is neither a πάθος nor a δύναμις, it must be a ἔξις.

∴ VIRTUE is a ἔξις = genus.

προαιρετικὴ is added on the strength of what was said in

- | | | |
|--------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Ch. 4. | 1. εἰδῶς. | } Requisites
of a
moral action |
| | 2. προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτό. | |
| | 3. βεβαίως καὶ αμετακίνητῶς ἔχων. | |

Ἐν μεσότητι οὔσα, τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς—in the relative mean. He shows that *every art, or practical science seeks the relative mean*, and avoids the extremes of excess and defect—*a fortiori*, this will be the case with the pre-eminent science of Moral Virtue.

ὁρισμένη λόγῳ is added, because the mean is relative and not mathematically exact; so that it must be determined from time to time by reason.

ὥς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὀρίσειεν is added, because it might be asked, Where is the reason to be found? Aristotle regards reason as embodied in the "man of practical common sense."

ANALYSIS.

In Bk. I. ch. 8, Aristotle proves his definition of happiness by comparing it with the definitions of *preceding philosophers*.

I.

Pythagoreans divided goods into three heads:

- (1.) τὰ ψυχῆς
- (2.) τὰ σώματος
- (3.) τὰ ἐκτὸς

but they made goods of the *soul* the most important. Aristotle's definition implies this, because—

- (a.) He makes Happiness an activity of the *soul*.
- (b.) Because "activity," or "moral action," is not *external*, but an *internal* good.

II.

The Happy Man is said εὖ ζῆν καὶ εὖ πράττειν, the definition of Aristotle is almost the same.

III.

The *Cynics* said that happiness was ἀρετή. Aristotle in his definition makes happiness an ἐνέργεια κατ'ἀρετήν, and it is important that we should consider it an ἐνέργεια, because it is only those who act rightly that can obtain the good and honorable things in life. [ἐπήβολοι τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ καλῶν.] I. viii. 10.

IV.

Socrates said it was φρόνησις, *practical wisdom*; the discussion of this, Aristotle leaves to the VIth Bk.

V.

Anaxagoras said it was σοφία, *speculative wisdom*; this again left to Bk. VI. (Baser element of world=νοῦς.)

VI.

The *Cyrenaics* said it was with *pleasure*. Aristotle agrees with this, because he thinks that his happiness will naturally involve pleasure of a higher kind:

- (1.) It is present in a *higher manner*: it is inherent in the acts themselves. [ὁ βίος καθ' αὐτὸν ἡδύς.]
- (2.) It is of a *higher sort*, natural [φύσει], not artificial.
- (3.) It is more *comprehensive*, including τὸ καλὸν + τὸ ἀγαθόν, as well as τὸ ἡδύς.

VII.

Xenocrates included *external prosperity*. Aristotle agrees with this, for he thinks it necessary that a man should have certain external advantages, i. e., he must not be deformed [παναίσχης], low-born [δυσγενής], or childless [ἄτεκνος].

VIII.

Delian epigram:

“Κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιοτάτον, λῶστον δ' ὑγιαίνειν,
ἡδιστον δὲ πέφυχ' οὐ τις ἐρᾷ τὸ τυχεῖν.”

This *separates* various kinds of excellent and advantageous things. Aristotle does not agree with it, because they are *all involved in his idea of happiness*, and although he thinks that prosperity is necessary to happiness, he does not agree with the *Cyrenaics*, who identify εὐτυχία with happiness.

SOLON'S DICTUM [χρεὼν τέλος ὁρᾶν].

BK. I. CH. 10.] SOLON SAID, "CALL NO MAN HAPPY TILL HE IS DEAD."

A. Did he mean that death was *positive* happiness? We who have made happiness an activity of the soul, cannot, of course, place it in the extinction of that activity.

B. But perhaps Solon did not mean that death was *positive* happiness, but that the dead might be *called* happy, as being beyond the reach of evils and misfortunes; but if there is *some good and evil* to the *living man*, who is not aware of it [μὴ αἰσθάνο-

μένῳ], is there not some also to *the dead*? e. g. honor and dishonor, and the good and evil of descendants.

Here there arises a question, whether he will not be affected by the good and evil of descendants (discussed in next ch.).

C. In looking to the end, then, are we to say that a man *has been happy*, and not to say that *he is happy now*, while he is enjoying happiness? and that, because we have conceived happiness to be something *μόνιμον* and unchangeable [*μηδαμῶς εὐμετάβολον*].

This is to make happiness depend on the *τύχαι*, whereas the virtuous energies [*αἱ κατ'ἀρετὴν ἐνέργειαι*] are its basis* [*κύριαι*], and the *βεβαιότης* wanted is nowhere greater than in those energies.

As regards *τύχαι* good or bad—

if *small*—they will not affect the *balance of life* [*ρόπή*],

if *large*—good ones will make life more happy; bad will crush or spoil happiness: still, even these may be the occasion of virtuous energies, and so far of happiness.

Bk. II. Ch. 4.] "WE BECOME JUST, BY DOING JUST ACTIONS,"
WHEN THE DOING OF THEM SHOWS US TO BE JUST.
(Apparent paradox.)

Just as a *work of art* shows a man to be an artist.

This last is not true; a man may do a work of art, *ἀπὸ τύχης* καὶ ἄλλου ὑποθεμένου, and is no artist, unless he *possesses skill in himself*.

Again, the arts are not a parallel case; *in the arts* we look only to the *excellence of the production* [*τὸ εὖ*]; and only knowledge is required,* but *in the virtues* we look to the *manner* of doing a thing. It must be done—

(1.) *εἰδῶς*—with knowledge.

(2.) *προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτό*—deliberate choice for the thing's own sake.

(3.) *βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων*—with fixity and stability.

* This incidentally confirms Aristotle's definition of happiness.

These are the three conditions in the mind of the agent, to make a virtuous action.

Bk. III. Ch. 5.] FREEWILL. "VIRTUE AND VICE ARE EQUALLY VOLUNTARY."

If the *end* is the object of wish [*βουλητόν*], and the *means* the object of deliberation [*βουλευτὰ*] and deliberate choice [*προαιρετὰ*], then the acts respecting these must be voluntary. Now, with these acts, virtuous energies are concerned; therefore *virtue* is voluntary; so, too, is *vice*, for if we can *do*, we can *forbear*, and vice versa (parity of reasoning).

Freewill is further proved:

- I. Man is the *ἄρχῃ* of his actions, and if so, they are *voluntary*.
- II. In *governments* the *voluntariness of wicked actions* alone causes them to be *punished by lawgivers*, who also reward virtuous actions (*practical proof*).
- III. As for *want of knowledge* [*ἄγνοια*] being an excuse, men are punished for that also, when self-caused and voluntary.
- IV. If *drunkenness* is the excuse, men ought not to have got drunk: if they were *ignorant of the laws*, they ought to have informed themselves of them.—["*Τοῖς μεθύουσι διπλᾶ τὰ ἐπιτίμια*," law of *Pittacus*, of *Mylene*.]
- V. But perhaps some men are *not capable of applying themselves to their duty*. Who made them so? They themselves did, by the repetition of such actions, as went to form their characters.
- VI. To plead that *they did not know* that such actions would form a habit, is a mark of extreme stupidity.
- VII. It is absurd for men to plead that they did not *wish* to become morally evil; men do not *wish* to become unhealthy.
- VIII. *Bodily faults* which are in our own power are blamed, and no others; therefore, vice being blamed, may be considered as in our power. (*Analogy*.)

IX. It may be said that a man aims at the *Φαινόμενον ἄγαθον*, and that this (or his *φαντασία*) is beyond his control, being constitutional. But if a man is *αἰτιός πως* of his constitutional habits, he is likewise of his *φαντασία*, which is assimilated to them. If not, the aiming at the end will be no matter of our choice, but fixed by nature, and then *virtues* will be involuntary, as well as vice: so that this proves too much.

X. Suppose the *end* to be fixed by Nature, still the *means* are in our own power, and if *virtue* is thus voluntary (as men allow), then *vice* must be voluntary too. Still, habits, when formed, are not so much in our own power as the single acts which formed them.

N. B. We are said to be *συναιτιοί πως*—"in some sense joint causes" of our habits—with circumstances: i. e. habits being formed by acting in a certain way, under certain circumstances. We can only choose *how we will act*, not under what circumstances we will act. Aristotle thus admits that our habits are, *to some extent*, the result of causes over which we *have no control*.

BK. II. CH. 2.] WHAT IS THE CHARACTER OF VIRTUOUS ACTS?

The standard is *ὀρθὸς λόγος* (but this point is reserved for Bk. VI.).

I. They are, then, acts which *avoid excess and defect*, both of which prevent the formation of good habits: they are therefore *ἐν μεσότητι*.

II. They are acts which *produce virtue*, and are in their turn *produced by virtue*; for by abstaining from pleasure we become temperate, and the more we abstain, the more we are able to do so.

These two points are suggested by the *analogy existing between the body and the soul*.

The *φανερὰ* are *bodily habits*, the *ἀφανῆ* the habit of the *soul*. The point of similarity is, that these are parts of the *same complex being*, and the argument from analogy is, that they resemble one another—

I. In their formation and growth [*γενέσεις καὶ αὐξήσεις*].

II. In their operation [*ἐνέργεια*] when formed.

ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY IN BK. II. CH. 6.

Science and art seek the relative mean, and avoid the extremes: à fortiori, this will be the case with moral virtue, which is *τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα*.

The argument here depends upon the *analogy* between virtue and the arts, i. e., between the work of man as a *moral agent*, and the work of man as an *artistic agent*; and the inference is, that what constitutes excellence in the one sort of work (artistic), will also constitute excellence in the other sort of work (moral).

Both will seek the relative mean, and avoid excess and defect.

BK. II. CH. 7.] FOR CATALOGUE OF VIRTUES, TO SHOW THAT VIRTUE IS A MEAN, SEE MOORE, PP. 112—113.

Aristotle gives the following as supplementary:

Excess.	Mean.	Defect.
καταπληξίς.....	αἰδώς.....	ἀναισχυντία.
φθόνος.....	νέμεσις.....	ἐπιχαιρεκακία.

But *νέμεσις* and *αἰδώς* are not mean states [*μεσότητες*]; that is to say, they are not stationary, as means are, but pass away, being *πάθη* merely; and because not *μεσότητες*, they are not virtues.

Νέμεσις is said to be a mean between *φθόνος* and *ἐπιχαιρεκακία*. These, however, are not opposed to each other, and may exist in the same man.

HE WHO FEELS PLEASURE AT VICE AND PAIN AT VIRTUE, IS A NOVICE AT BOTH.—(Cf. Moore, p. 78.)

(Cf. *Butler's Analogy*, Ch. V., six pages from beginning: "For from our very faculties of habits, passive impressions, by being repeated, grow weaker" to "view of it.")

When a man first begins, he may act with a greater zeal and zest, but when the habit is formed, he will have a more quiet satisfaction. A young soldier may enter on his first battle with

greater impetuosity, but the veteran is more calm, and each may have his respective pleasure.

So, contra, as regards pain, we may feel it more acutely when we first begin to do what is against the grain, but in time we become inured to it, and feel a less acute pain, and get more insensible to the disagreeable.

EXPLAIN—

Πεπαιδευμένου γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον τὰκριβὲς ἐπιζητεῖν
καθ' ἑκάστον γένος, ἐφ' ὅσον ἡ τοῦ πράγματος φύσις ἐπιδέχεται.

Aristotle several times tells us in Bk. I. that *accuracy* is not to be sought in questions of moral philosophy. We find this in his account of the *mean*, *anger*, etc., and in the *division of the soul*.

He says that matters of moral action and expediency have no fixedness [*βεβαιότης*], and that they come under no set of rules [*παραγγελία*], but that we must act according to circumstances.

It is in the application of rules to particular details of practice, that our responsibility rests.

No rules can be so framed that evasion shall be impossible.

Since *praise* and *blame* (the awards of *virtue* and *vice*) are bestowed on *voluntary* actions, while *involuntary* ones meet with *συγγνώμη* and *ἔλεος*, we ought to show what actions are voluntary and what involuntary. The knowledge of this is important to legislators, who have to reward and punish.

Involuntary actions.

βίαιον, οὐ ἢ ἀρχὴ
ἔξωθεν, τοιαύτη οὖσα,
ἐν ᾗ μηδὲν συμβάλλεται
ὁ πράττων ἢ ὁ πάσχων

δι' ἄγνοιαν

ἀκούσια

done in ignorance of some circumstance of the fact (*ignorantia facti*): not blameable if attended with repentance, e. g., an undergraduate shot his companion, and was greatly distressed at the inquest: this is *ἄκων*.

οὐκ ἐκούσια

(*ignorantia facti*)

being not followed by repentance are blameable, e. g. a man does another an injury accidentally, and says, "I did not mean to do it; but never mind, it is just as well as it is:" this is *οὐκ-ἐκῶν*.

Voluntary actions.

οὐ ἢ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ,
εἰδότες τὰ καθ' ἑκάστα,
ἐν οἷς ἡ πράξις.

ἄγνοῶν.

Ignorance of the principle (*ignorantia juris*), blameable: e. g., a criminal was hanged for shooting a clergyman, and wounding the clergyman's wife—rejoiced in the murder, justified it, and hoped that the wife would die:—e. g., manslaughter.

PERHAPS SOME ONE WILL SAY, FROM OUR EXPLANATION OF βίαιον, THAT ἡδέα AND καλὰ ARE SO, ἀναγκάζειν γὰρ, ἔξω ὄντα.

I. But in this way we shall do nothing but what is βίαιον, for the καλόν and the ἡδὺ enter into all our actions as their principle.

- II. Moreover, βίαια cause us to act λυπηρῶς, but the καλὰ and ἡδέα; μεθ' ἡδονῆς.
- III. It is absurd [ἄτοπον] for a man to blame external circumstances, and not himself, who is so easily caught [εὐθηρατός] by them, or again, to ascribe the καλὰ to himself, but the αἰσχροῦ to pleasure.

FIVE REASONS WHY THINGS DONE FROM SPIRIT [θυμός] AND FROM APPETITE [ἐπιθυμία] ARE NOT INVOLUNTARY.

- I. If these actions are involuntary, no animals, besides men, not even children, will be voluntary agents, because these are the motives from which they act.
- II. Perhaps the καλὰ are ἐκούσια, and the αἰσχροῦ are ἀκούσια. It is absurd, however, to suppose that *one cause* [be it θυμός or ἐπιθυμία] should produce *opposite effects*.
- III. We cannot drop the ἐκούσια, because ἐπὶ τισι δεῖ ὀργίζεσθαι, καὶ τινῶν δεῖ ἐπιθυμεῖν. δεῖ is here the emphatic word. The sense of *duty* excludes the notion of involuntariness. If we *ought* to do anything, it is clearly a voluntary act to do it.
- IV. We must drop the ἀκούσια, for such are λυπηρὰ, but the actions we speak of are not so.
- V. We feel that τὰ κατὰ λόγισμον ἀμαρτηθέντα and τὰ κατὰ θυμόν are equally φευκτά. If one class were voluntary and the other involuntary, we should not have the same feeling about both, and as man's passions and reason are equally his, it is absurd to attempt this distinction between the acts which result from them.

MIXED ACTIONS.

Partaking of the nature of both, being most like voluntary actions, inasmuch as the principle of action is internal [ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ], but abstractedly involuntary, inasmuch as all would absolutely avoid them [καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν ἀκούσια].

Praised.	Blamed.	Pardoned.	Not Pardoned.
When for some great good, or to avoid some great evil, we do that which we would not.	When for some little good, or to avoid some little evil, we do that which we would not.	When under the influence of some great bodily torment, we do that which we ought not.	When for any reason, we do an overwhelmingly disgraceful act, as Alcmaeon, who slew his mother, Eriphyle, because his father commanded him.
e. g. Zopyrus, Scavola, Regulus.	e. g. Esau.	e. g. Naaman. 2 Macc. vi. At the feast of Bacchus the Jews were compelled to go in the procession carrying ivy.	

HOW DOES ARISTOTLE'S SYSTEM IMPLY A FIXED STANDARD OF MORALITY, AND HOW WOULD THE ABSENCE OF SUCH A STANDARD AFFECT HIS DOCTRINE OF THE MEAN?

It is said that because there is no παραγγελία, set of rules (Bk. II. Ch. 2), no *objective* code in Aristotle's system (the standard being the subjective one, of the good man), therefore there is no fixed standard.

This at first sight seems plausible—that the standard is variable—inasmuch as notions of right and wrong frequently shift, and, as Paley says, "Every vice has in its turn been deemed a virtue; even assassination, to promote, by a tyrant's death, the public good." But Aristotle's "good man" [σπουδαῖος] would not allow this. He would hold that *right is always right, and wrong always wrong*, and that *expediency* would never convert *wrong* into *right*.

For instance, the principle of justice is eternal, though its exemplification and details may vary: the good man intuitively per-

ceives this [μαντεύεται] by his own unassisted light; and what thus "appears to him, appears to every good man, semper, ubique etc." This question is discussed in Bk. III. Ch. 4., in the Dilemma, respecting the ἀγαθόν and the βουλευτόν, where he shows that τὸ ἀγαθὸν βουλευτόν is identical with τὸ φαινόμενον to the good man. (Cf. Bk. X. Ch. 6. Sec. 5.) As regards the σπουδαῖος, therefore, whether regarded morally in himself [σώφρων], or as regards others [δίκαιος], or intellectually [φρόνιμος], the standard is always fixed and unchangeable as regards essential principles, any determination as to details being left to his κρίσις; how far he may be angry, etc. Cf. ἐν αἰσθήσει κρίσις.

The latter part of the quotation may be answered by implication; the good, to be good, will be in the good man's subjective mean: if it were an extreme either way it would not appear good to him, for the mean differs from the excess and defect in kind, and not in degree.

ILLUSTRATE THE PRACTICAL CHARACTER OF ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY.

- (a.) He says (in Bk. I.) that the object of his treatise is οὐ γνώσις ἀλλὰ πράξις.
- (b.) The young should be taught the practice of morals, before they attempt the theory.
- (c.) He rejects Plato's abstract ideal of good, as its truth or falsehood is indifferent to ethics.
- (d.) He defines happiness as Ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς κατ' ἀρίστην ἀρετήν. He confines himself to the discussion of man's happiness and man's virtue.
- (e.) In Bk. II. he says that the object of his treatise is not mere speculation, but to make men good.
- (f.) He shows that moral virtue is acquired by practice and not by nature.
- (g.) He lays down distinctions between
 ἐνέργεια and δύναμις
 ἐνέργεια " ἔξις
 χρῆσις " κτήσις.

- (h.) He shows in spite of theory, that external prosperity is necessary to complete the idea of happiness.
- (i.) He rejects the notions of the Stoics, who define the virtues as states of mere quietude. [ἀπαθείας τινὰς καὶ ἡρεμίας.] Virtue consists in the due regulation of all the parts of our nature (Book X.).
- (j.) In conclusion, he shows that in matters connected with ethics, theory must be carried on to practice. Hence we must look to some authority to enforce good habituation.
- (k.) It is inductive, starting from common facts [ὅτι] that are within the observation of all—ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς.
- (l.) Theory of habits in Bk. II.
- (m.) Rules for conduct in Bk. II. 9.

MODIFICATION OF THE MEAN.

Aristotle's mean is not an absolute mean, but a relative one—relative, i. e. to the circumstances of different individuals. It is impossible to lay down rules which will meet every case, or to reduce morals to a rigid or mathematical precision. This appears from the words ὠρισμένη λόγῳ in his definition of virtue. That is, the varying standard of the mean must be calculated from time to time by reason. He says it is difficult to define "how, and with whom, and on what occasions, we should be angry.*" Small deviations from the ideal mean are not important, and we must sometimes incline to the excess, and sometimes to the defect, for so we shall be most likely to hit the mean. Three practical rules are given:

- (1.) Avoid the extreme, most opposed to the mean, in the nature of things.
- (2.) Avoid the extreme, to which our natural inclination [ἐπιδοσις] tends.
- (3.) Beware of pleasure.

CLASSIFICATION OF GOODS.

First division:

- (1.) Goods pursued for their own sake.

* Cf. St. Paul, "Be angry, and sin not."

(2.) Goods pursued for their *own sake*, and for the *sake of something else*.

(3.) Goods pursued for the *sake of something else*.

Second division :

(1.) *External goods*.

(2.) Goods of *soul*.

(3.) Goods of *body*.

Third division :

(1.) *Potential*, can be abused according to taste of possessor.
Cf. riches and bodily strength = potential.

(2.) *Actual*, cannot (I. 12.).

LEGISLATORS.

(1.) Bk. I. 13. Legislators study *ἀρετή*, e. g. those of the *Cretans* and *Lacedæmonians*; hence it is in conformity with Aristotle's plan to consider it.

(2.) Bk. III. Legislators, who have to *reward and punish*, should know what actions are *voluntary*, and what *involuntary*.

(3.) Bk. III. The practice of legislators [*νομοθέτης*] confirms Aristotle's view, that *vice is voluntary*: they *reward virtue* and *punish vice*.

(4.) He shows that *moral training* must be enforced by the *intervention of the state*.

Φιλία.

(1.) Bk. II. Enumerated as one of the *πάθη*—"liking," "affection."

(2.) Bk. II.-IV. As a *virtue*; "friendliness," or "courtesy" [*φιλία ἀνευ τοῦ στέργειν*].

(3.) Bk. VIII. "Friendship."

Δύναμις.

(1.) Bk. I. 1. *τέχνη* as opposed to *science*.

(2.) As a *class of goods* with *ἐπαινετὰ* and *τίμια*—Bk. I. 12.
δυνάμεις = things which are potentially, but not necessarily good (cf. riches).

(3.) Bk. II. *Capacities* of receiving impressions from the *πάθη* (potentially) in the same chapter with *ἐξεις* and *πάθη*.

N. B. *δύναμις* (capacity) potentially is opposed to *ἐνέργεια*

(activity), because *δύναμις* may be *dormant or abused*: cf. *ἐνέργεια*—*ἐξεις*, *χρήσις*—*κτήσεις*.

INSTANCES OF EXTREMES MEETING.

(1.) The *rash* man is also a *coward*.

(2.) The *prodigal* is also *illiberal*.

(3.) The *falsely modest* man is also *boastful*.

NAMELESS STATES.

(1.) There is a *nameless mean* on the subject of *small honor*, the extremes are said to contend for it. Cf. the illustration of the favorite dish. [*ἀμφισβητεῖν τὰ ἄκρα*.]

(2.) *ὀργιλότης*—*πράότης*—*ἀοργησία*, are names employed for the states *περὶ ὀργήν*.

Φαντασία = τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν. *ὄρεξις* [= *βούλησις*], wish, desire, occurs in definition of *προαίρεσις* = *βουλευτική ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῶν*.

Aristotle draws his illustrations from three sources:—1. Medicine; 2. Gymnastics; 3. Lawgivers.

Πολιτική.

(1.) Bk. I. 2. *Moral Philosophy*.

(2.) Bk. I. 2. *μέθοδος πολιτική τις* = treatise on moral philosophy.

(3.) *πολιτική* = *statesmanship*.

(4.) Bk. III. *πολιτική* = *first and best of the spurious kinds of courage*.

(5.) *πολιτικός φύσει* = *social being*.

(6.) *πολιτικός βίος* = *life of a citizen*, with all its privileges of which slaves have no share.

(7.) Bk. I. 13. *πολιτικός* = *moral philosopher, lawgiver, politician*.

(8.) *πολιτικά* = *native militia*.

"MORAL VIRTUES ARE 'STATES' OF THE EMOTIONS."

Explain, and discuss how far Aristotle agrees with this.

Before answering this question, we settle the meaning of the word "state" in English. If it means "present condition, which may be transitory, it is a *κίνησις*, and the above accordingly is not true. But if by "state" we mean the "settled character," it will be true enough in regard to moral virtue, but it does not touch intellectual virtue. Aristotle would make *ἔξεις* "settled ways of being affected by the *πάθη*, either *εὖ* or *κακῶς*. "*ἔξεις* = *καθ' ὥς πρὸς πάθη ἔχομεν εὖ ἢ κακῶς*; e. g., if our anger is too vehement or too slack, *κακῶς ἔχομεν*; but if it is in the mean, *εὖ ἔχομεν*. We are said *κινεῖσθαι*, by the *πάθη*, which are *transient* merely, but *διακινεῖσθαι* by the *ἔξεις*, which are lasting.

DUTY.

Aristotle's notion of duty is expressed when he says: *Δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὀργίζεσθαι ἐπὶ τισι, καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν τινῶν δε*.

So, too, in Bk. II. 9: *Ἀποκλίνειν δὲ δεῖ, ὅτε μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπερβολήν, ὅτε δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν ἑλλειψιν*.

EDUCATION.

- (1.) Bk. I. Only an educated man [*πεπαιδευμένος*] fit student for moral philosophy.
- (2.) Bk. II. 1. Makes no little difference whether we are trained in such or such a way from our youth. [*ἡχθαι*.]
- (3.) Plato said that true education consisted in learning to *like and dislike the right thing*.
- (4.) Bk. X. 9. *Moral training* as necessary for the attainment of virtue.

A MAN SIGNS AN AGREEMENT UNDER COMPULSION—HOW WOULD ARISTOTLE HOLD HIM OBLIGED TO KEEP IT?

The act of signing was *βίαιον*—hence Aristotle would pardon [*συγγνώμη*] the man for breaking the agreement, if for any great good, or to avoid any great evil (involuntary).

OBJECTION RAISED TO THE STATEMENT THAT MORAL VIRTUE CAN ONLY BE OBTAINED BY PRACTICE.

As the virtues all come by habituation, does it follow that we must be habituated "to each and every one?"

Ans.—We may be placed in such circumstances, that we cannot develop all the virtues: e. g., if in moderate circumstances, we may be *ἐλευθέριοι*, but it will be impossible for us to be magnificent; but suppose prosperity to come to the poor man, his liberality would become *μεγαλοπρέπεια*; so the *μεγαλοπρέπης* if reduced in circumstances, would become *ἐλευθέριος*, as his *φρόνησις* would keep him right.

A man conceals his convictions to obtain preferment. He is *blamed*, because for *small good*, he does what he *ought not to do*. (Mixed actions.)

A man is keenly disappointed in seeing a favorite dish emptied before it reaches him, but he suppresses his mortification, and does not betray it. The nameless mean of small honor—*μέτριος* and *σώφρων*. (Ambition.)

ARE THE VIRTUES SEPARATE OR NOT?

The virtues are separate inasmuch as they are on *different subjects*; at the same time the *σπουδαῖος* will be in possession of them all "potentially," through *φρόνησις*.

RELATION OF PLEASURE TO HAPPINESS.

The *Cyrenaics* (Eudoxus) said that happiness was with *pleasure*. Aristotle agrees with this, because he thinks his happiness *involves pleasure of a higher kind*.

- (1.) It is pleasant in a *higher manner*—i. e., it is inherent in the acts themselves. *Ὁ βίος καθ' αὐτὸν ἡδύς*.
- (2.) It is of a *higher sort*—natural (*φύσει*), not artificial.
- (3.) It is more comprehensive, as it includes the *τὸ ἀγαθόν* and the *τὸ καλλόν*, as well as *τὸ ἡδύ*.

In Bk. X. Aristotle shows that *happiness* is an activity according to the highest virtue, viz., the virtue of the *intellect*, which has a *pleasure of its own*, which helps to intensify the activity.

Though such a life would be beyond man, he teaches that we should aspire to the satisfaction of our divine nature [*ἀθανατίζειν*], and only cultivate earthly things in a lower way.

SHOW THE RELATION OF HAPPINESS TO VIRTUE.

The relation is explained in Aristotle's definition of happiness—*ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς κατ' ἀρίστην ἀρετὴν ἐν βίῳ τελειῶν*. *ἀρίστη ἀρετή* is explained in Bk. VI. at full length, and in Bk. X., recapitulated, it is said to be—

- (1.) *κρατίστη*.
- (2.) *συνεχεστάτη*.
- (3.) *ἡδίστη*.
- (4.) *αὐτάρκτης*.
- (5.) *μόνη δι' αὐτὴν ἀγαπᾶσθαι*.
- (6.) *ἐν σχολῇ*.

Afterwards the life of the intellect is shown to be *κρείττων ἢ κατ' ἄνθρωπον*, so that [*δευτέρως*] moral virtue must be cultivated. The sum of the whole being that the good man [*σπουδαῖος*] alone can be intellectually and morally happy.

TEMPTATION.

No man is blamed for being caught [*θηρατός*], but for being easily caught [*εὐθηρατός*].

The *ἐγκρατής* is tempted, but overcomes temptation. In Bk. II. 8. Aristotle says that we are *εὐκατάφεροι μᾶλλον πρὸς ἀκολασίαν ἢ πρὸς κοσμιότητα* (orderly conduct), and that we are led by our *bias* [*ἐπίδοσις*] to that extreme, which is more contrary to the mean.

Bk. 2. 9. He says that in order to *discover the mean*, we must consider those things to which we are *εὐκατάφεροι*—pleasure and pain are the test.

As regards *pleasures*, Aristotle would follow a *middle course*, between the *Cyrenaics* and *Cynics*. While *Cyrenaics* exalted *ἡδονή*; the *Cynics* would destroy it. The *Cyrenaics* would regard Helen as Paris did, whereas the *Cynics*, like Hector, would call her *πῆμα*. Aristotle, like the *δημογυρόντες*, would acknowledge her beauty and send her away.

Bk. III. 1. He says that intense pleasure of actions, *ἡδέα καὶ καλὰ*, is in no case to be considered a source of compulsion, which can excuse them.

Bk. III. 5. He says that if we are *responsible for our state* *ἔξῃς*, we must be so in some degree, for the *impression* [*φαντασία*] things make upon us: i. e., if we are tempted by external cir-

cumstances, there is something within to make those circumstances temptation, or to make us susceptible of temptations from them.

SHOW THE CONNECTION OF MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE.

This is indicated by Aristotle's very definition of moral virtue—

ἔξῃς προαιρετικὴ ἐν μεσότητι οὕσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὠρισμένη λόγῳ καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὀρίσειεν.

Cf. also his continual appeal to *ὀρθὸς λόγος*, which is in reality *φρόνησις* (practical wisdom), which being practical leads to action, and its activity is *ἡθικὴ ἀρετή*. In all the books (except VI.) we have moral virtue, and in Bk. VI. we have intellectual alone. In Bk. X. he *harmonizes the two*, combining *ἡθικὴ* and *φρόνησις*, and gives the higher place to *θεωρία*, which is the activity of speculative wisdom [*σοφία*].

He teaches that we are *ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν*, but as we are mortals we need moral virtue, *πρὸς τὸ ἀνθρωπεύεσθαι*, for in *actual life*, *intellectual activity* cannot be separated from *moral practice*.

METHOD OF ARISTOTLE.

Aristotle and Butler start with *ὅτι*, facts, and go on to principles, *ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς*.

Given a machine, find out its use.

Take human nature as it is; enquire the end of its creation; start with *ὅτι*, facts, and go up to principles. Thus Aristotle examines man's *ἔργον* and investigates his *ζωή*. He supposes him to have an *ἔργον*, since all his parts have; he finds *as a matter of fact* that he has certain passions; he assumes that they are part of man's machinery; they are given him for some purpose, and their use is found by cultivation. As to the reason *δι' ὅτι*, whether man would be better without them, he does not enquire, but he goes on the great principle *οὐδὲν φύσει ματὴν*. Thus also he treats pleasure, he finds it *ἐγκχερωσμένον*; so *ὀργή* and *ἐπιθυμία*, these lower facts are *γνωριμὰ ἡμῖν*, and we proceed from effect to cause. Plato, on the other hand, starts with the *δι' ὅτι*, i. e. *ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν*: *given the use, find the*

machine. He starts with principles and constructs an imaginary man to suit those principles; thus he proceeds from cause to effect—ἀπὸ τῶν ἀπλῶς γνωρίμων.

WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE ETHICS? HOW DO THE DIVISIONS OF THE SOUL, THE DISCUSSION OF THE VOLUNTARY, THE EXAMINATION OF THE VIRTUES, COME INTO A TREATISE, WITH SUCH A PURPOSE?

The main purpose of the Ethics is the *discovery of the chief good, or final end, of all man's aspirations*.

He identifies the *chief good* with *Happiness*, which is defined ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς κατ' ἀρίστην ἀρετήν, ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ.

As *Happiness* is thus defined, we must know what ἀρετή is, and to know this, we must ascertain what the *soul* is.

The rational part of the soul is considered as twofold:

- (1.) λόγον ἔχον κυρίως (in its own right) καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ.
- (2.) λόγον ἔχον ὥσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκούστικόν τι.

ἀρετή is likewise divided according to this difference into—

- (1.) Intellectual [διανοητική].
- (2.) Moral [ἠθική].

And since *praise and blame* are the awards of virtue and vice, they are bestowed on voluntary actions, while involuntary actions meet with συγγνώμη and ἔλεος. Aristotle in Bk. III. discusses what actions are voluntary and what involuntary.

Aristotle defines virtue as—

ἔξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὠρισμένη λόγῳ, καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὀρίσειεν.

Hence he discusses the virtues at length, to show how the *law of the relative mean is applicable to every virtue in detail*.

Aristotle speaks of his treatise as a *practical* one—οὐ γνῶσις, ἀλλὰ πράξις—and hence a knowledge of the virtues generally, would seem to be necessary—ὡς ἀγαθοὶ γενώμεθα.

RELATION OF PLEASURE TO VIRTUE.

Bk. II. 3. Pleasure and pain are the tests of moral habits be-

ing formed. So long as pain is felt at doing any action, we may be sure that the habit is imperfectly formed; when the habit is formed, we feel pleasure.

CONNECTION OF VIRTUE WITH PLEASURE AND PAIN.

I. Men commit sin for the sake of pleasure, and abstain from what is right through dread of pain; hence Plato (II. 3. 3.) says that we should be educated in early youth to feel pleasure and pain at proper objects.

II. *Virtue* is conversant with *actions* and *passions*, and these are attended with *pleasure and pain*.

III. *Punishments* to promote the cause of virtue prove the same thing, they are themselves *pains*, and being correctives, are, like all medicinal applications, the *opposites* of what they remedy: here the disease is pleasure.

IV. Habits are formed, not as the *Cynics* say, by *indifference to pleasure and pain*, but by feeling pleasure and pain when we ought. Hence the *exercise* of moral habits (i. e. of *moral virtue*) will be exhibited in feeling *pleasure and pain* when we ought.

V. There are 3 *objects of choice*—

- (1.) τὸ καλόν.
- (2.) τὸ σύμφερον.
- (3.) τὸ ἡδύ.

and 3 *objects of aversion*—

- (1.) τὸ αἰσχρόν.
- (2.) τὸ βλαβερόν.
- (3.) τὸ λυπηρόν.

Now the *good man goes right*, and the bad man goes wrong, in all, particularly in pleasure, which includes the καλόν and the σύμφερον.

VI. The *feeling* of pleasure—

ἐν νηπίου πᾶσιν ἡμῖν συντέθραπται.

It is engraved [ἐγκεχρωσμένον] in our lives.

VII. As *motives for action*, pleasure and pain are constantly present.

VIII. Virtue (as well as art) is shown in struggling with difficulty [περὶ τὸ χαλεπώτερον] and there is nothing so difficult to resist as pleasure.

DEFINE ACCURATELY "MORAL NATURE."

Moral nature may be defined as *that part of man's compound nature* [σύνθετον] *which comprises the passions, instincts, and appetites.*

Man's moral nature may be seen from Aristotle's division of the soul. In accordance with this division, he divides the virtues, *intellectual* [σοφία, σύνεσις, φρόνησις] and *moral* [ἐλευθεριότης, σωφροσύνη].

It is by the gradual perfection of our moral nature and the cultivation of moral virtue, that we are brought into that state in which the intellectual principle is able to act purely and uninterruptedly.

HOW FAR DOES ARISTOTLE RECOGNIZE DIFFERENT DEGREES OF CAPACITY IN MEN FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF HAPPINESS? QUOTE PASSAGES.

Definition—ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς κατ' ἀριστήν ἀρετὴν ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ.

Bk. I. 9. He speaks of happiness as πολύκοινος, within the reach of all who are not incapacitated [πεπηρωμένος] for virtue, but he excludes *women, slaves* [εὐδαιμονίας δ' οὐδεὶς ἀνδραπόδω μεταδίδωσιν, εἰ μὴ καὶ βίου.—Bk. X. Ch. 7, § 8], and *children*, as incapable of ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετὴν.

Bk. X. He shows that *perfect happiness* consists in intellectual activity [θεωρία]. Practically, none but the *best men* can approach, even imperfectly, to such εὐδαιμονία. Most men never rise above that which constitutes human happiness, εὐδαιμονία ἀνθρωπινή. The more men approach the happiness of the gods in the contemplative life, the more happy will they be; indeed, there is a scale of corresponding degrees between happiness and the capacity for intellectual activity: in the lower animals both are totally absent; in gods both are present in

perfection; among men both exist imperfectly, but in exact proportion to each other.

TO WHAT EXTENT MAY IT BE SAID THAT ARISTOTLE'S THEORY IS INTENDED TO ASSIST THE MORAL PROGRESS OF SOCIETY?

Ethics, according to Aristotle, formed a sub-division of πολιτικῇ, moral philosophy, the *science of human life*; the other two parts being *economics* and politics (statesmanship). *Ethics*, therefore, or the science of individual good, must be the *groundwork of the rest*, for unless the parts be good, the whole cannot be perfect. The *development of man's moral nature* is the *introduction to the principles of human society*, hence he defines happiness as ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς, etc. He discusses the different virtues at length, showing the degrees of relation they have to society. Cf. frequent mention of lawgivers [νομοθέτης]:

- (1.) They study ἀρετή.
- (2.) They reward and punish.
- (3.) Their practice confirms his views, that *vice is voluntary*.

Bk. X. Aristotle insists that moral training must be enforced by the intervention of the State.

IN WHAT POINTS, CHIEFLY, DOES MORAL VIRTUE DIFFER, AND IN WHAT DOES IT RESEMBLE THE ARTS?

- (1.) In virtues as well as in arts, the ἐνέργειαι precede the δύνάμεις.
- (2.) Two opposite effects, virtue and vice, proceed from the same cause, so it is with the arts; there would be no need to teach them, if they invariably produced the same effects.
- (3.) It is not necessarily true that he who does good deeds is a good man; so neither is it necessarily true that he who succeeds in a work of art is a good artist, for his success may be owing to accident [ἀπὸ τυχῆς] or the suggestion of another [ὑπ' ἄλλου ὑποθεμένου].

- (4.) In arts we look merely to the *excellence of the production*, and only knowledge is required [*γνώσις*]. But in the virtues, we look to the manner of doing a thing—it must be done—

(a) *εἰδώς*.

(b) *προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτό*.

(c) *βιβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων*.

- (5.) *Science and art seek the relative mean*, and avoid the extremes, à fortiori, this will be the case with *moral virtue*, which is *ἀκριβεστέρα πάσης τέχνης*.

- (6.) Art and virtue are conversant with that which is more than ordinarily difficult [*περὶ τὸ χαλεπώτερον*].

HOW DOES ARISTOTLE DESCRIBE THE NATURE OF HIS METHOD? AND HOW FAR IS HIS TREATISE CONSISTENT WITH THESE STATEMENTS?

Aristotle begins with *τί προτιθέμεθα, πῶς ἀποδεκτέον* (how he is to admit of proof) *περὶ ἀκροατοῦ*. We must not expect too much accuracy in subjects of moral investigation. He says to judge aright in these matters, education is necessary; and a young man is not fitted for the study of Moral Philosophy, as wanting experience, and because he has not the command of his passions—*κατὰ πάθος ὂν*; a thing which this practical treatise especially looks to, *τέλος γὰρ* (i. e. of the treatise) *οὐ γνώσις, ἀλλὰ πράξις*.

But in point of fact, *his treatise is not a code of morals, like the New Testament*. The only *practical rules* are those which refer to *pleasure*.

He says (Bk. I. 7.) that *τὰ πάρεργα* are not to be *πλείω τῶν ἔργων*; this rule he violates by the introduction of digressions (cf. Bk. I. 6 and 10, and account of virtues. He digresses—

(1.) That Happiness comes from gods.

(2.) Solon's dictum [*τυχαί*].

(3.) Divisions of soul.

(4.) The difference between praise and encomium.

WHICH IS NEAREST THE MEAN, EXCESS OR DEFECT?

If the virtue consists in encouraging a passion, naturally too weak, then the excess is nearer; e. g. *θρασύτης, ἀσωτία*.

If the virtue consists in restraining a passion naturally too strong, then the defect is nearer; e. g. *ἀναίσθησις*.

DO VIRTUES AND VICES DIFFER IN KIND OR DEGREE?

In answering this question, we may enquire whether *rashness* is too much of real courage, or whether it is a different thing altogether. True courage implies—

(1.) *διὰ καλόν τι*.

(2.) Due appreciation of danger.

(3.) Sometimes caution.

But the *rash* man fails in the 2d point. Therefore, *rashness differs from real courage in kind*, but not in *degree*.

Again, the *ἐλευθέριος* is careful to give to proper objects, in proper quantities, and at the proper times, etc., but the *ἄσωτος* does not care how he gives.

If the *ἄσωτος* had too much of the *ἐλευθέριος*, he would have too much of the *ὅσα ἔπεται τῇ ὀρθῇ δόσει*.

Hence also *prodigality* differs from *liberality* in *kind*, but not in *degree*.

ACCOUNT OF PHILOSOPHERS.

I. *Aristotle*, a peripatetic, B.C. 350. He belonged to no School. His system was to state his own opinion, and compare it with those of other people.

II. *Plato* held the doctrine of "Ideal Good" (Bk. I. 4): thought education very important.

III. *Anaxagoras* thought "Happiness was *σοφία*" (speculative wisdom): thought that baser element of world was *νοῦς*.

IV. *Xenocrates* taught that "external good was necessary to happiness."

V. *Cyrenaics* held that "Happiness was pleasure"—*ἡδονὴ τὸ πᾶν*. Aristippus was their founder. Not mentioned in *Ethics*, but *Eudoxus* is (Bk. I. 12). They developed into the Epicureans.

- VI. *Cynics* (Antisthenes was their founder) said that "Happiness was ἀρετή"; and that virtue was a "kind of apathy." Cf. Bk. I., where Aristotle says that a man is φύσει πολιτικός. In contradiction to this, the Cynics said that if a man was virtuous, he was single and independent [μονότης]. They developed into the Stoics (I. 10).
- VII. *Heraclitus* said that "Pleasure was more difficult to fight against than spirit" (θυμός, which Heraclitus says is so hard to contend against).
- VIII. *Socrates* said that "Happiness was φρόνησις" (practical wisdom).
- IX. *Anacharsis* said that "We ought to sport, in order to work afterwards."
- X. *Solon* said, "We must look to the end," and that "The happy man was he who was moderately furnished with external goods, and practised virtue" (Bk. X. 8).
- XI. *Pythagoreans* (or Italici, mathematical school founded by Pythagoras) held that "Numbers were the element," and held the "Doctrine of Metempsychosis." Archytas was one of them. They are alluded to in Bk. I. 6-8. τριχῇ, threefold division of goods. Bk. I. 10. They compare a good man to a perfect cube [τετράγωνος ἄνευ ψόγου].
- XII. *Sophists*, alluded to in Bk. I., where the words are—"ὥστε νόμος δόκει μόνον εἶναι," by convention only. They and Paley afterwards thought that right and wrong existed by convention only, and not by nature. They are alluded to in Bk. III., where Aristotle speaks of the "good man" as being the μέτρον and κανὼν of truth to himself.
ὥστε δοκεῖν νόμον μόνον εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μή (doctrine of Sophists). "Moral distinctions are determined by convention only, and not by nature" (Bk. I. Ch. 3, § 3).
- XIII. *Simonides* thought "That it was better to be rich than wise." Because philosophers were dependent on

the patronage of the rich, and not *vice versa*, the liberal man was thought to be "no friend of his" (Bk. IV. 1): οὐκ ἀρεσκόμενος.

- XIV. *Theognis* said that "Physicians would have received great rewards if they could heal the mind as well as the body."

PREFERENCE OF πολιτική TO ἠθική.

Aristotle divides πολιτική into three parts:

- (1.) Ethics—relating to individuals.
- (2.) Economics—relating to families.
- (3.) Politics—strictly so called; i. e. statesmanship.

Ethics, therefore, or the science of individual good, must be the groundwork of the rest, families and states being composed of individuals.

The branch of πολιτική, which we call Ethics, bears the same relation to the larger sciences as the hewing and squaring of the stones to the building of the temple, or the drill of the recruit to the manœuvres in the field.

The Greeks regarded the πόλις as the primary consideration, and the individual as merely secondary. We find this vein running through the whole of the Ethics—e. g. πολιτική (Moral Philosophy) is said to be κυριωτάτη, ἀρχιτεκτονική.

Aristotle says also: εἰ γὰρ καὶ ταῦτόν ἐστιν ἐνὶ καὶ πόλει, μείζον γε καὶ τελεώτερον τὸ τῆς πόλεως φαίνεται καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ σώζειν. Ἀγαπητόν, μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐνὶ μόνῳ, κάλλιον δὲ καὶ θειότερον ἔθνει καὶ πόλεσιν. Cf. too the continual reference to lawgivers. Again, the virtues affect the state, e. g. μεγαλοφυχία. Cf. also in Bk. X.: the slave cannot be happy because he has not the life of the πολίτης.

The Greeks, again, in the education of their children, made everything subordinate to their taking part in the ἐκκλησία.—(Thucyd.)

PROCESS BY WHICH ARISTOTLE ARRIVES AT HIS DEFINITION OF HAPPINESS.

Aristotle, having premised that there is some one τ' αγαθόν, enquires into its nature, and after having stated his system (ac-

curacy not to be expected), he assumes that τ' ἀγαθόν is εὐδαιμονία, and rejects certain theories.

He then lays down two conditions which τ' ἀγαθόν demands and εὐδαιμονία fulfils:

- (1.) τέλειον.
- (2.) αὐταρκές.

He further says that the ἀγαθὰ of other things are looked for in their ἔργα, in their doing well what they have to do.

Man's ἀγαθόν must be looked for in his ἔργον. But has he one? He has, as a shoemaker, carpenter, etc. Surely, then, he has one "qua" man. The compound parts of him have one—eyes, feet, hands, etc., surely, then, the whole.

What, then, is man's ἔργον? To live? This is too general a thing to be called his ἔργον, for brutes and plants live. But if we set aside the life of sensation and growth, we shall have the life of "rational activity" remaining in him only. So the ἔργον of man is ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς κατὰ λόγον, and as the good man energizes, κατὰ λόγον εὖ, we substitute ἀρετὴν for λόγον, and if there are more ἀρεταὶ than one, the ἀρίστην of these—the ἔργον of man is then—

ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς κατ' ἀρίστην ἀρετὴν ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ.

Bk. IV. 9.

ἐγκρατεία = μικτή τις—a conquering of the evil passions after a struggle, just as the παραλελυμένα τοῦ σώματος μόρια are made to go the right way.

ἀκρασία = would make the palsied limbs go the wrong way. παρὰ (against) προαίρεσιν.

ἀκολασία = would lead a man to act διὰ προαίρεσιν.

QUOTATIONS FROM HOMER.

- (1.) Τούτον μὲν κάπνου καὶ κύματος ἐκτὸς ἔργε νῆα.
Circe, not Calypso, gave this advice: "Go further from the extreme, which is most opposed to the mean.

- (2.) Hector says:
Πουλδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχείην ἀναθήσει.

Diomedes:

εἰ Εὐπύρ γὰρ ποτε φήσῃ ἐνὶ Τρώεσσ' ἀγορεύων
"Τυδείδης ὑπ' ἐμεῖο" [φοβούμενος ἵκετο νῆας].

Illustrating that *spurious* form of courage which arises from *fear of public opinion*.

- (3.) Hector again:

"Ὀν δὲ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μάχης πτώσσοντα νοήσω
οὐ οἱ ἄρκιον ἐσσεῖται φυγέειν κύνες.

Illustrating that *spurious* form of courage which arises from the *fear of punishments*.

- (4.) σθένος ἔμβαλε θυμῷ

καὶ

μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἔγειρε

καὶ

δριμὺ δ' ἀνὰ ρῖνας μένος

καὶ

ἔξεσεν αἶμα.

Illustrating the *spurious* kind of courage which arises from *spirit* [θυμός].

EXTERNAL PROSPERITY.

- Bk. I. 8. Aristotle says that some think that happiness includes τὴν ἐκτὸς εὐετηρίαν. He agrees with this, inasmuch as he holds that it is *not easy to do honorable actions without external means*.

- Bk. I. 10. Human life stands in need of *external goods* "as additions" (*amulet*). This forms part of his definition of a happy man.

- Bk. X. *Intellectual happiness* wants τῆς ἐκτὸς εὐετηρίας, *less than moral happiness*, but as man's nature is not αὐτάρκης πρὸς τὸ θεώρειν, he will require a *moderate degree of external prosperity*.

- Bk. X. Solon thought that a man, μετρίως τοῖς ἐκτὸς κεχορηγημένος, practising τὰ κάλλιστα, and living σωφρόνως was the happy man.

OBJECTIONS TO ARISTOTLE'S SYSTEM.

- (1.) He makes the "mean" *too rigid and absolute, not allowing for differences of character.*
- (2.) *His list of virtues is both redundant and defective.* (All the virtues from *ἐλευθεριότης* down, may be included under *σοφροσύνη* [σωζω-φρην]).
- (3.) *Many of his virtues are not moral virtues.* E. g. *εὐτραπεία*, and the nameless mean about small honor. Again, *ἀληθεία* (truthfulness in behavior) is not a moral virtue, nor is *φιλία* (friendliness).
- (4.) *Aristotle leaves out such virtues as chastity, humility, self-denial, duty to God and parents.*

TRACE CAREFULLY THE DIFFERENT STAGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF VIRTUE. IS THE ACCOUNT TRUE? IS IT COMPLETE?

Bk. II. 1. He says that "virtues do not come by nature," but *πεφυκόσι μὲν ἡμῖν δέξασθαι αὐτάς, τελειούμενοις δὲ δια τοῦ ἔθους* (formed by nature to receive them and being perfected by habit), i. e. we have the *capacity* by nature, then we act, and if our actions are according to the requisites

- (1.) *εἰδώς*
 - (2.) *προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτὸ*
 - (3.) *βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων*
- our *individual actions* harden into *habits*, and these *ἔξεις* form *character*.

Aristotle's account is true and complete as regards heathen moral virtue, but Christianity does not allow that there is any such thing as natural piety: "For the natural man receiveth not the things of the spirit of God" (St. Paul); so that his being *τελειούμενος δι' ἔθους* is out of the question. Aristotle again omits such virtues as chastity, humility, etc.

ARISTOTLE'S CONCEPTION OF THE NATURE AND ACTION OF THE GODS.

- (1.) Nature.
- (2.) Action.

- (1.) Quite distinct from human beings, and also *above commendation*, because praise implies reference to a standard, and there is no standard to which we can refer the gods.

If the gods interfere in human affairs, and give anything to men, the best of all human goods would come from them; happiness is the best, therefore, if the *gods give anything*, they would give *happiness* to men.

Their existence consists in *νόησις νοήσεως*.

- (2.) Activities of 3 kinds—

1. *ποιητική*
2. *πρακτική*
3. *θεωρητική*

1. *Productive*—that of artizan—gods are above this.
2. *Moral*, implies desires and reason, but the gods do not have desires and emotions, therefore moral activity does not apply to them.
3. Therefore we have narrowed the activity of the gods down to *θεωρητική*; therefore, the activity of the gods is contemplative, or intellectual.

NATURAL DISPOSITION, INSTRUCTION, HABITUATION. SHOW THE EFFECT OF EACH OF THESE IN THE FORMATION OF A VIRTUOUS CHARACTER.

Nature gives all men a capacity for virtue, though this needs to be developed by training. Some are more *εὐφρεῖς* than others.

Starting from this, the separate virtues are developed by *habituation* and *instruction*—the latter either from parents or friends, or from the state, or laws; but instruction is useless unless attended by habituation.

By what terms would Aristotle characterize—

- (1.) Murder.
- (2.) Manslaughter.
- (3.) Homicide by Misadventure?

- (1.) *Murder* is a *voluntary act*, therefore there is no justification. A man could only justify it by believing it not

wrong, but this would be ἡ καθόλου ἄγνοια, and does not make it involuntary.

(2.) *Manslaughter* is a case of acting ἄγνοῶν.

(3.) *Homicide by Misadventure* comes under ἡ καθ' ἑκαστα ἄγνοια. E. g. a man fencing for pleasure finds the button off his foil, and slays his friend. He did not intend any harm, but through accidental ignorance of particulars, the harm results. On this follows not punishment, but ἔλεος καὶ συγγνώμη; this ignorance making the action *involuntary*.

FIVE SPURIOUS FORMS OF COURAGE.

I. Πολιτική=Social Courage, is divided into two kinds—

- (1.) That which results from *public opinion*.
- (2.) That which results from *fear of punishment*, which is a much lower motive—

{ cf. Πολυδάμας
"Εκτωρ
ὄν δὲ κ' ἐγών, &c. }

II. Ἐξ ἐμπειρίας=Experience. This results from familiarity with the empty [κενὰ] grounds of terror in war, and from familiarity with weapons. The difference between this and real courage is seen by a comparison between the conduct of regular troops, rank and file (στρατιῶται) [who become cowardly when the danger surpasses their experience, ὑπερτείνῃ] and that of native militia [πολιτικά]. Socrates thought courage = ἐπιστήμη.

True courage implies

- (1.) διὰ καλόν τι.
- (2.) Due appreciation of the danger.
- (3.) Sometimes caution.

Each of the spurious kinds will be found deficient in one or the other, or both of the first two qualifications.

III. ἐκ θυμοῦ=Spirit—

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \sigmaθένος, \text{ etc.} \\ μένος, \text{ etc.} \\ \deltaριμύ, \text{ etc.} \\ \text{ἐξεσεν αἶμα.} \end{array} \right\}$$

Aristotle acknowledges that *bravery has a large element of this*, and illustrates his view from Homer. But it obeys the dictates of an irregular passion.

IV. οἱ εὐέλπιδες=Sanguine. Their courage is based on like motives with that of the experienced; when they find the danger greater than they expected [μὴ συμβῇ], they fly.

V. ἐξ ἀγνοίας=Ignorant. The courage of the ignorant is akin to that of the sanguine, but worse, for they have no opinion of themselves [οὐδὲν ἀξιῶμα], and when the danger exceeds their expectations, they fly.

ὁ σπουδαῖος.

Bk. I. 8. *Virtuous actions are pleasant*, if σπουδαῖος judges rightly about them.

Bk. III. 4. The σπουδαῖος sees truth in everything, since he is, as it were, the *rule* and *measure* of it—κανὼν καὶ μέτρον. Cf. Sophists.

Bk. X. 6. Those things are *honorable* [τίμια] and *pleasant* [ἡδέα], which are so to the σπουδαῖος.

Bk. II. 6. In definition of moral virtue [καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ πρό- νιμος ὀρίσειεν]. Aristotle regards *reason as embodied in the man of practical common sense*.

CATALOGUE OF VIRTUES.

Excess.	Mean.	Defect.
θρασύτης	ἀνδρεία	δειλότης
ἀκολασία	σωφροσύνη	ἀναισθησία

<i>Excess.</i>	<i>Mean.</i>	<i>Defect.</i>
ασωτία	ἐλευθερία	ἀνελευθερία
βαναυσία	μεγαλοπρέπεια	μικροπρέπεια
χαυνότης	μεγαλοφυχία	μικροφυχία
φιλοτιμία	(ἀνώνυμος)	ἀφιλοτιμία
ὀργιλότης	πραότης	ἀοργησία
ἀλαζονεία	ἀλήθεια	εἰρωνεία
βωμολοχία	εὐτραπελία	ἀγροικία
ἄρεσκος + κόλαξ	φίλος	δύσερις + δύσκολος
κατάπληξ	αἰδήμων	ἀναίσχυντος.

DEFINITIONS.

Chief Good = οὐ πάντ' ἐφίεται.

Happiness = τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν.

τέλειον = καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ οὐδέποτε δι' ἄλλο.

αὐτάρκες = ὁ μονούμενον αἰρετὸν ποιεῖ τὸν βίον καὶ μηδενὸς ἐνδεῖ.

Aristotle's definition of happiness } ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς κατ' ἀρίστην ἄρε-
 } τὴν ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ.

Excellence [ἀρετὴ] = πᾶσα ἀρετὴ, οὗ ἂν ἡ ἀρετὴ, αὐτό τε εὖ ἀποτελεῖ, καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ εὖ ἀποδίδωσι.

Moral virtue [ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ] = ἕξις προαιρετικὴ, ἐν μεσότητι οὔσα, τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὠρισμένη λόγῳ, καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὀρίσειεν.

βίαιον = οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν, τοιαύτη οὔσα, ἐν ἣ μηδὲν συμβάλλεται ὁ πράττων ἢ ὁ πάσχων.

ἐκούσιον = οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ, εἰδότει τὰ καθ' ἑκαστα, ἐν οἷς ἡ πράξις.

προαίρεσις = βουλευτικὴ ὁρεξις τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν.

ἀνδρεία = μεσότης περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρη.

φόβος = προσδοκία κακοῦ.

ἀνδρείος = ὁ περὶ τὸν καλλὸν θάνατον ἀδεής, καὶ ὅσα θάνατον ἐπιφέρει, ὑπόγνια ὄντα.

σωφροσύνη = μεσότης περὶ ἡδονάς.

ἐλευθεριότης = μεσότης περὶ δόσιν καὶ λῆψιν χρημάτων.

χρήματα = πάντα ὅσων ἡ ἀξία νομίσματι μετρεῖται.

ἀσωτία = ἡ τῷ δίδόναι καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν ὑπερβάλλει, τῷ δὲ λαμβάνειν ἁλείπει.

ἀνελευθεριότης = ἡ τῷ δίδόναι ἁλείπει, τῷ λαμβάνειν δ' ὑπερβάλλει, πλὴν ἐπὶ μικροῖς.

μεγαλοπρέπεια = ἐν μεγέθει πρέπουσα δαπάνη.

βάνανσος = ὅς ἐν τοῖς μικροῖς πολλὰ ἀναλίσκει, καὶ λαμπρύνεται παρὰ μέλος.

μικροπρέπεια = ὅς περὶ πάντα ἁλείπει, καὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἀναλώσας, ἐν μικρῷ τὸ καλὸν ἀπολεῖ.

μεγαλόφυχος = ὁ μεγάλων αὐτὸν ἀξίων, ἄξιος ὧν.

σώφρων = ὁ μικρῶν ἄξιος καὶ τοιῶν ἀξίων ἑαυτόν.

χαῦνος = ὁ μεγάλων ἑαυτὸν ἀξίων, ἀνάξιος ὧν.

μικρόφυχος = ὁ ἐλαττόνων ἢ ἄξιος, ἀξίων ἑαυτόν.

πραότης = μεσότης περὶ ὀργάς.

πραός = ὁ ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ, καὶ οἷς δεῖ, ὀργιζόμενος, καὶ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ ὅτε, καὶ ὅσον χρόνον.

φιλία (Courtesy) = φιλία ἄνευ τοῦ στέργειν.

ἄρεσκος = ὁ τοῦ ἡδὺς εἶναι στοχαζόμενος, μὴ δι' ἄλλο τι.

κόλαξ = ὁ τοῦ ἡδὺς εἶναι στοχαζόμενος, ὅπως ὠφέλειά τις αὐτῷ γίγνηται εἰς χρήματα καὶ ὅσα διὰ χρημάτων.

δύσκολοι = οἱ πρὸς πάντα ἀντιτείνοντες, καὶ τοῦ λυπεῖν οὐδ' ὅτι οὖν φροντίζοντες.

ἀλάζων = ὁ προσποιητικὸς τῶν ἐνδόξων, καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχοντων, καὶ μειζόνων ἢ ὑπάρχει.

εἴρων = ὅς δοκεῖ ἀρνεῖσθαι τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, ἢ ἐλάττω ποιεῖν.

ἀλευθητικὸς = ὁ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἐμολογῶν εἶναι περὶ αὐτόν, καὶ οὔτε μείζω, οὔτε ἐλάττω.

εὐτραπελία = μεσότης περὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ἐν παιδίᾳ.

εὐτράπελοι = οἱ ἐμμελῶς παίζοντες.

βωμόλοχοι=οἱ γλιχόμενοι πάντως τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ
μᾶλλον στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ γέλωτα ποιῆσαι, ἢ τοῦ
λέγειν εὐσχήμονα, καὶ μὴ λυπεῖν τὸν σκωπτόμενον.
ἄγριοι=οἱ μὴτ' αὐτοὶ ἂν εἰπόντες μὴθὲν γελοῖον, τοῖς
τε λέγουσι δυσχεραίνοντες.

ἐπιδεξιότης=τοιαῦτα λέγειν καὶ ἀκούειν, οἷα τῷ ἐπιει-
κεῖ καὶ ἐλευθερίῳ ἀρμόττει.

αἰδώς=φόβος τῆς ἀδοξίας.

And Bk. II.:

μεσότης καταπλήξιως καὶ ἀναισχυντίας.

THREE KINDS OF IGNORANCE.

(Under general head of Involuntary Actions.)

- (1.) ἡ καθόλου ἄγνοια=e. g. man says drunkenness is not wrong.—Denial of great principles of morality.
- (2.) ἡ ἐν τῇ προαίρεσει ἄγνοια=denial of a particular case, falling under some admitted general principles: e. g., a man says drunkenness is wrong, but says to drink this will not make me drunk.
- (3.) ἡ καθ' ἕκαστα [ἄγνοια]=ignorance of details: e. g., a man says drunkenness is wrong, but this liquid is water, but he finds he has drunk gin by mistake.

The only kind of ignorance which makes an act involuntary is this last, i. e., accidental ignorance of circumstances attending the action. It is followed by ἔλεος and συγγνώμη.

δύναμις.

Physical Matters.

Nature gives us a δύναμις, which results unavoidably in certain actions, e. g. seeing, in sight, only one issue.

Moral Matters.

Nature gives a δύναμις, this produces πάθη, but these may be good or bad, i. e. it is a "δύναμις τῶν ἐναντίων," and therefore not parallel to physical δύναμις. But these πάθη may be so guided that a ἔξις is reached, and then only good or only bad (as the case may be) can be done: i. e. this ἔξις really equals a δύναμις, with only one result—either virtue or vice. This acquired δύναμις is parallel to the natural physical δύναμις.

Therefore Aristotle usually has δύναμις in morals in the last sense, as almost equal to ἔξις, but still sometimes uses the term in the first sense (cf. Bk. II. 5. 1.).

PROPER OBJECTS OF Βούλησις.

- I. "That objects of desire are *really good things*, and so ultimately the 'chief good.'"—Plato. This contradicts facts, as men desire bad things.
- II. "That they are *whatever may appear to each individual to be good*" [ἐκάστῳ τὸ δοκοῦν].—Sophists. This seems to deny that there are objects *per se* desirable, and *vice versa*.

The truth seems to be, that as when we speak of things being wholesome and so on, we mean wholesome to those whose bodies

are in a healthy state [τοῖς μὲν εὖ διακειμένοις]; so, also, when we speak of things being desirable, we mean such things as are objects of desire to those whose minds are well regulated. Thus we escape both the above objections: we maintain that there are things *naturally* and *per se* desirable, and that in the midst of the aberrations and perversions of individual men, who simply follow pleasure and avoid pain, the *desires of the σπουδαῖος* are an index to us of what is thus *naturally* and *per se* desirable.

Ψυχή.

- I. 7. 14. ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς = in arriving at man's function.
 I. 13. 9. ψυχῆς δύο μέρη = rational and irrational.
 I. 13. 7. δεῖ τὸν πολιτικὸν εἰδέναι τὰ περὶ ψυχῆς = the definition of happiness implies a knowledge of the nature of virtue, and consequently of the nature of the soul.

Φύσις.

- III. 3. 7. φύσις αἰτιὸν τι = under proper objects of deliberation.
 II. 1. 2. οὐδὲν τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἄλλως ἐθίζεται = moral virtue differs from intellectual excellence in that it is *not innate*—i. e., moral virtue does not come by nature.
 X. 9. 6. φύσις οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει = in three ways of acquisition of virtue—
 (1.) φύσει.
 (2.) ἔθει.
 (3.) διδασχῇ.
 II. 1. 3. οὐτε φύσει οὐτε παρὰ φύσιν αἱ ἀρεταί = in proof that moral virtue does not come by nature.

DESCRIBE THE VIRTUE OF μεγαλοπρέπεια.

ἐν μεγέθει πρέπουσα δαπάνη.—Fitting expenditure on a large scale. Its general characteristic is magnitude, but this must be in relation to three things—

- (1.) The person who gives.
- (2.) Circumstances of gift.
- (3.) The object of gift.

Hence every munificent man is liberal, but not *vice versa*.

Defect = μικροπρέπεια = meanness.

Excess = βαναυσία and ἀπειροκαλία—bad taste and vulgarity.

There is a sort of *scientific skill* implied in μεγαλοπρέπεια; cf. ὁ μεγαλοπρεπὴς ἐπιστήμονι ἔοικεν; to decide *under what circumstances* great expenditure is befitting. There must be the desire of what is noble—τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα.

Munificent acts must be done *cheerfully* and *ungrudgingly*—ἡδέως καὶ προετικῶς; there must be no close calculations of how much? or how little? will it cost.

Fitting occasions for the display of munificence, e. g.:

- (1.) Service of religion—λειτουργία.
- (2.) Great public or patriotic services (equipping a trireme) [τριηράρχῳ], or defraying the expenses of a *state embassy* [ἀρχιθεωρῷ].
- (3.) Wedding [ὅσα εἰσάπαξ γίνεται], entertaining strangers [ὑποδοχὰς ξένων], making [δωρεάς] and returning presents [ἀντιδωρεάς].
- (4.) Toy-presents to children, e. g. σφαῖρα and λήκυθος—but this is not such greatness as to constitute μεγαλοπρέπεια in its proper sense.

ETHICS.—BOOK I.

Ch. 1. *τέλη*—"ends or objects of action." All human action aims at some good as its *τέλος*. Such *τέλη* are either

- (1.) Acts—*ἐνέργειαι*, or
- (2.) Certain results—*ἔργα*.

Thus *τέλη* are manifold, and they may be arranged in an *ascending scale*, according to the importance of the actions to which they are relative.

Ch. 2.* *τὸ τέλος*—the "chief good." The *supreme end of all action* will be the "chief good," to know which is important as a *guide to right conduct*. Naturally, it will be the *τέλος* of the highest and most comprehensive of the sciences, i. e. of *πολιτική* (the *τέλος* of the state having fair claims to be ranked higher than that of each individual).

Ch. 3. The "study of Ethics" (a digression). *ἀκριβεία* is not to be expected in a science dealing with subject-matter so vague, as justice, virtue, &c. Hence its conclusions will be general.

The proper judge on points of Ethics will be the *παιδευμένος*, and not young people, because

- (1.) Inexperienced [*ἄπειρος*].
- (2.) Impulsive [*κατὰ πάθος ὁρῶν*].
- (3.) Unable to profit by the steady.

N. B. People may be young in character, as well as in years [*νέος τὴν ἡλικίαν ἢ τὸ ἥθος νεαρός*].

Ch. 4. *εὐδαιμονία* is on all sides allowed to be "the end," or "chief good," of man, but people have different

views as to the nature of *εὐδαιμονία*: e. g.

- (1.) Uneducated, think it is *something relative*; e. g. pleasure, wealth.
- (2.) Philosophers, *something absolute*.

The Method of Ethics (a digression).

Ethics must start with *moral facts*, as known to us, for its *ἀρχαί*, and these facts must be supplied by proper education, by a process of *ἐθισμός*.

Ch. 5. What is Happiness?

- (1.) *βίος ἀπολαυστικός*—end *ἡδονή*. This is a low view (cf. Sardanapalus).
- (2.) *βίος πολιτικός*—end *τιμή*; but this is (a) precarious; (b) sought as a proof of *ἀρετή*.
- (3.) *βίος θεωρητικός*—end *σοφία*; this is *κρείττων ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπον*, so that *δευτέρως*, we must *ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν*. Cf. Bk. X.

- (4.) *βίος χρηματιστής*—end *πλοῦτος*, but this is only a *means to a higher end*, and does violence to our natural inclinations [*βίαιός τις*].

Ch. 6. Criticism of Platonic Doctrine.

Ch. 7. General Characteristics of Happiness.

- (1.) It is the end and object of all moral action.
- (2.) *ἁπλῶς, τέλειον*, absolute and final end, always to be sought for its own sake, and never for the sake of something else, as pleasure and honor are sought.
- (3.) *αὐτάρκες*, and so above, and not to be classed with other *ἀγαθά*.
- (4.) The *ἔργον* of man being, not in the life of nourishment and growth [*θρεπτική* and *αὐξητική*], or of sensation [*αἰσθητική*], but in the *moral life of a rational being*—

πρακτική τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος; and the exercise of this life in its highest form, i. e. κατ' ἀρετὴν, constitutes happiness; but this requires time, so ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ. "Ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ." (Digression.)

Given an outline of Happiness, time will fill in the details, only let it be remembered—

- (1.) ἀκριβεία must not be expected.
- (2.) That certain facts [τὸ ὅτι] must be accepted as axioms or principles [ἀρχαί] to start with.

These ἀρχαί must be properly obtained and rightly defined—

- (1.) ἐπαγωγῇ.
- (2.) αἰσθήσει.
- (3.) ἐθισμῷ.

Ch. 8. Current theories about Happiness shown to harmonize with the definition now advanced—

1. Popular [τὰ λεγόμενα].

- (a.) That the soul's good is the highest.
- (b.) That the highest good is an activity of some kind.
- (c.) That Happiness consists in "living and doing well."

2. Philosophical theories—[τὰ ἐπὶ ζητούμενα] that Happiness consists in

- (a.) Virtue.
- (b.) Prudence.
- (c.) Wisdom.
- (d.) One of these, with pleasure added.
- (e.) This, with external prosperity added.

As to *a* the definition agrees with it, and improves upon it; *d*, the definition necessarily implies pleasure, and that of the highest kind; *e*, the need of external prosperity is acknowledged in a moderate degree.

Ch. 9. How is Happiness attained?

- (1.) If anything, it would naturally be θεόσδοτος, but this belongs to ἄλλη σκέψις.
- (2.) Though certainly "θειότατον," it is also πολύκοινον, and attainable by a course of study and training to all who are not "πεπηρωμένοι πρὸς ἀρετὴν."
- (3.) Not due to τύχη, for this would be παρὰ φύσιν.
- (4.) As the end of πολιτικῇ, it seems attainable by State instruction.
- (5.) Not being attributed to children or the lower animals, it seems to imply a perfect ἀρετὴ and βίος.

Ch. 10. How far does Happiness really depend on external circumstances? Is it true, as Solon said, that "a man cannot be called happy as long as he lives"? [χρεὼν τέλος ὀρᾶν].

- (1.) Even after death, a man can be affected by the fortunes of those living.
- (2.) If rightly called happy after death, why should he not be called so, while actually happy in lifetime?

The fact is that Happiness is dependent on "αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργειαι," which are pre-eminently *lasting and stable*, and not on τυχαί, the effect of which is comparatively slight.

Thus the "εὐδαιμόνων" is never ἄθλιος or εὐμετάβολος. On the whole, Solon's dictum is not right. A man may rightly be called happy in his lifetime, if he satisfies our definition, but only happy *qua* man.

Ch. 11. Are the dead wholly independent of the fortunes of the living? Not wholly, but yet so far that *their happiness is substantially secure*.

Ch. 12. Does *εὐδαιμονία* belong to *ἐπαινετὰ* or *τίμια*?

1. Not to *ἐπαινετὰ*, for

(a.) *ἐπαινος* implies reference to a standard, whereas *εὐδαιμονία* is itself the highest good, and so beyond all standards.

(b.) *ἐπαινος* is specially directed to *ἀρετή* (not *εὐδαιμονία*),

2. but to *τίμια*, for it is "*ἀρχὴ καὶ αἴτιον τῶν ἀγαθῶν*."

Ch. 13. Since *ἀρετή* (1) enters into the definition of *εὐδαιμονία* (2), and is the special concern of the *πολιτικός*, it is necessary to ask, What is *ἀρετή*? and since the *ἀρετή* now in question is *ψυχῆς ἀρετή*, we must further ask, What is meant by *ψυχὴ*? adopting the popular account.

1. *τὸ ἀλογον*, which itself includes

(a.) *θρεπτικόν* (not distinctively human, and specially active in sleep, which is *ἀργία ψυχῆς, ἣ λέγεται σπουδαία καὶ φανύλη*).

(b.) *λόγου μέτεχον*, which in *ἐγκρατεία* and *ἀκρασία*, is found in conflict with, though capable of being submissive to,

2. *τὸ λόγον ἔχον*, which thus includes

(a.) *λόγον κυρίως ἔχον*.

(b.) *ἀκουστικόν λόγον*.

Hence *ἀρετή* may be divided into—

(1.) *διανοητική*.

(2.) *ἡθική*.

DESIRES ARE OF TWO KINDS:

(1.) Those which are *common* [*κοινὰ*].

(2.) Those which are *acquired* [*ἐπιθετοὶ* and *ἴδιοι*].

The former every one feels, but in the latter tastes vary.

Few err in the first, and only in the direction of quantity. Such persons are called *γαστρίμαργοι*.

But concerning peculiar desires, many err and in many ways. It is clear that in this ill-regulated pursuit of pleasure consists the excess in reference to the virtue of temperance, i. e., intemperance.

In relation to pain, however, it does not consist like cowardice, in shrinking from it, so much as in feeling at the absence of pleasure. In Ch. X. 1. temperance is said to be a mean state, on the subject of pleasures and pains, but to be less concerned with pains. That is to say, the temperate man does not get his character (like the courageous man) from enduring pain, but from not feeling pain at the loss of pleasure; so that practically the operation of temperance is confined to pleasures. Those who are in the defect with regard to pleasures do not exist. Such a person, therefore, is nameless. The temperate man holds a mean position between excessive devotion and utter insensibility to pleasure.

INTEMPERANCE IS MORE VOLUNTARY THAN COWARDICE, IF WE CONSIDER THE SINGLE ACTS.

(1.) Because in intemperance the pressure arises from pleasure, whereas in cowardice it arises from pain.

(2.) Because it is safe and easy to resist temptations to intemperance, but the reverse is the case with temptations to cowardice.

But if we consider these vices as *habits*, cowardice is more voluntary than intemperance, for no one deliberately resolves to be intemperate, as he sometimes does to be a coward.

THINGS TERRIBLE [*τὸ φοβερόν*] ARE OF TWO KINDS.

(1.) *ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπων*.

(2.) *κατ' ἀνθρώπων*.

Every man of sense will fear the former. The latter differs in magnitude, and may be feared too much or too little. The brave man fears, or feels confidence, at what he ought, when he ought, and from the right motive. [*ὁρίζεται γὰρ ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει*]; that which characterizes anything is its end; *τὸ καλόν* characterizes courage, and therefore it is its end, or motive. He who is in the extreme of fearlessness is nameless, but may be called

μαινόμενος ἢ ἀναλγητός = if he feared neither σεισμόν nor κύματα, as they say—καθάπερ φασὶ τοὺς Κελτούς. He who is in the extreme of confidence is rash [θρασύς]. He is also a boastful man. Such persons are impudent cowards. He who is in the extreme of fear is δειλός. The rash are eager before dangers [προπετεῖς], but when those dangers come they stand aloof [ἀφίστανται]: whereas the brave are quiet beforehand [πρότερον δ' ἡσύχιοι], but when the crisis comes, active [ὀξεῖς].

Suicide is no proof of courage, because a man merely dies to avoid greater evils.

SOCIAL VIRTUES.

There is a nameless mean state between over-complaisance [ἄρεσκος] and surliness [δύσκολος]. It most resembles friendship, except that it does not necessarily argue any affection to the person to whom we show it [φιλία ἄνευ τοῦ στέργειν]. Such a person is agreeable to all, whether acquainted [γνώριμους] or unacquainted [ἀγνώτας] with him, but he acts on every occasion as is fitting [ἐν ἐκάστοις ὡς ἀρμόζει], all this having reference to τὸ καλόν. He will always prefer to give pleasure, where it is honorable to do so. If the action would bring disgrace to the person who does it [κὰν τῷ ποιούντι δ' ἀσχημοσύνην φέρῃ], he will show disgust [δυσχεραίνει]. But he who aims too much at giving pleasure, if he does it for no motive, is over-complaisant [ἄρεσκος]; but if he does it for a motive, he is a flatterer [κόλαξ]. The man who is in the defect, who feels disgust at all things [πᾶσι δυσχεραίνων], is a quarrelsome and ill-tempered man [δύσκολος and δύσερις].

The mean state connected with boastfulness is nameless. Now the boastful man is one who pretends to honorable things, which do not belong to him. The man in the defect is called the falsely-modest man [εἴρων]. The man in the mean is a straightforward kind of person [αὐθέκαστος], who always speaks and acts truthfully. He rather inclines to defect, because it appears to be in better taste. He who pretends to greater things than he really has, if it is for no motive, appears to be rather a foolish, than a bad man; but if he does it for the sake of money, he is more disgraceful.

The falsely-modest man, inclining to the side of defect, appears to be in better taste. Of this character was Socrates. Under this head come the "affected knaves" [βαυκοπανοῦργοι]; sometimes this exceedingly false modesty appears to be boastfulness, as in the case of the Lacedæmonians.

Since there is recreation in life and pastime with sport, there is a mean state connected with this. Those who exceed in the ridiculous are called buffoons. Those who do not say anything laughable, and are displeased with those who do, are clownish [ἄγριοι] and surly [συληροί]. The man who is in the mean state is called the man of graceful wit, as being εὐτροπος, or versatile.

Buffoons [βωμολόχοι] are sometimes so called. But they differ much. The difference between that which is becoming in jesting and what is unbecoming, may be seen in the old and new comedy. Tact [ἐπιδεξιότης] is particularly connected with well-bred wit.

BOOK X.

The final explanation of the true nature of Happiness is now given. The conclusions of the First Book being recapitulated, it is clear that Happiness must be something chosen for its own sake. This might be thought to be amusement, but few would allow this to be the final aim of life, since the very notion of amusement is the occupation of the intervals of work. The self-chosen end, then, must be virtuous action. Happiness being the energy of the highest virtue, we must ascertain what is the highest virtue. This will be the exercise of the highest faculty, intellect, on the highest subject-matter, in the highest method, which, as before proved, is contemplative speculation, or wisdom [*θεωρία*]. Wisdom is most continuous, most pleasant, most self-sufficient, self-eligible, and most consistent with leisure. This life of wisdom is the life of man, so far as he has an element of the divine nature in him—not of man, as man—a being compounded of intellect and affections. The secondary form of happiness belonging to man, “qua” man, is to be found in moral virtue, the central virtue of which is Prudence.

Whilst moral virtue needs many external advantages, wisdom requires few if any. The wise man lives the life most akin to the divine, and therefore, if the gods at all regard men, he will be the man most beloved by the gods. The end of the whole treatise being practical, it remains to ask, How are men to become good? Natural goodness is the gift of heaven to few. Instruction avails little for the undisciplined. Moral training or education is the most important agency in the formation of goodness. This education would be best conducted by the State, but when this is impossible, domestic education must be conducted by the head of each household. But whence must the head of each family learn the true principles of education? Politicians cannot teach him, for they are mere empirics; Sophists cannot teach him, for they are mere theorists. Aristotle therefore proposes himself to write a treatise on the true principles of education,

especially as they should be exhibited in a State. This he has done in the “Politics.”

Τὸ τέλος.

An end or final cause implies intelligence—implies a mind to see and desire it. The appearance of ends and means in Nature (and this Aristotle distinctly recognizes) is a proof of design in the operations of Nature. When we come to Ethics, what is meant by “an end of human actions”? For whom is this end? Is it an end fixed by a higher intelligence? In short, is the principle of Aristotle the same as the religious principle that a man is born to work out the religious purposes of his Maker? To this it must be answered that Aristotle is indefinite in his physical theory as to the relation of God to the design exhibited in Creation. And so too he is not explicit, in the “Ethics,” as to God’s moral government of the world. On the whole, we may say at present that “moral government,” in our sense of the words, does not at all form a part of Aristotle’s system. His point of view rather is, that as physical things strive all, though unconsciously, after the good attainable by them under their several limitations, so man may consciously strive after the good attainable in life.

We do not find in the “Ethics” the expression *τέλος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*, but *τῶν πρακτικῶν τέλος* (I. 7. 8.). It is best, therefore, to exclude religious associations (as being un-Aristotelian) from our conception of the ethical *τέλος*, and then we may be free to acknowledge that it is evidently meant to have a definite relation to the nature and constitution of man. Thus Aristotle assumes that the desires of man are so framed as to imply the existence of this *τέλος* (I. 2. 1.). He asserts that man can only realize it in the sphere of his own proper functions [*ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*—I. 7. 10.], and in accordance with the law of his proper nature, and its harmonious development [*κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν*—I. 7. 15.]. Is man then, according to this system, to be regarded similarly to one of the flowers of the field, which, obeying the law of its organization, springs and blooms and attains its own peculiar perfection? This is no doubt, one side, so to speak, of Aristotle’s view. But there is

also another side, for while each part of the creation realizes its proper end, and in the language of the Bible "is very good," this end exists not *for* the inanimate or unconscious creatures themselves, it only exists *in* them. But the ethical τέλος not only exists *in* man, but *for* man; not only is the good realized in him, but it is recognized by him as such; it is the end not only of his nature, but of his desires; it stands before his thoughts and wishes and highest consciousness as the absolutely sufficient, that in which he can rest, that which is *in* and *for* itself desirable. [ἀπλῶς δὲ τέλειον τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν αἶ—I. 7. 4.]. The ends of physical things are for other minds to contemplate, they are ends objectively. But ends of moral beings are ends subjectively, realized by and contemplated by those moral beings themselves.

The final cause, then, in Ethics, is viewed as it were from the inside; or rather, the peculiarity is that the objective and subjective sides of the conception both have their weight in Aristotle's system, and are run into one another. The τέλος τῶν πρακτῶν, or absolute end of action, has two forms, which are not clearly separated. In the first place it is represented subjectively, as happiness, and in the second place, objectively, as the "morally beautiful."

FREEWILL.

Some place the ground of action in enlightened selfishness, or utility, with or without religious sanctions added, and others in an authoritative internal principle, the dictates of conscience, or an intuitive moral sense; while Kant rejects as unworthy all external motives and inducements to right action, and endeavors to reduce all to the idea of duty, as an *a priori* law of the will. On this point the utterances of Aristotle are simpler than those of modern moralists. He takes a broad view of man, as a creature in the universe, and asks what is the chief good of man, and how is it attainable? He answers that the "summum bonum" consists in the sense of vital action in accordance with the law of man's being [ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετήν]; that this is only permanently attainable by the formation of habits; and that ἔξεις arises out of acts. On the inducements to partic-

ular acts, he speaks only incidentally. He says (III. 1. 11.) that the beauty of an act may put us under a sort of compulsion to do it; that we have an intuitive sense of moral beauty [αἰσθητική μεσότης]; that we have a general wish for the good (III. 4. 4.) which furnishes the idea of the end to be aimed at in action, and that it is only a very foolish person [κομιδῇ ἀναίσθητου—III. 5. 12.] who does not take the right means to this, or who forgets that a single bad act tends to the formation of a bad habit. All this absorbs the right in "the beautiful" and "the good," and refers everything in life to the law of man's being; it is a great and simple theory. Yet still the conception of "the right" is deeper than that of "the beautiful" and "the good." It springs perhaps from a Semitic source, and with its cognate conceptions of duty and obligation, it predominates over the ethical systems of modern times, which are thus strongly distinguished in character from a Greek system of the fourth century B. C.

THE "IRONY" OF SOCRATES.

Aristotle says: "Irony often consists in disclaiming qualities that are held in esteem," and this sort of thing Socrates used to do (IV. 7. 14.).

The irony of Socrates, like any other living characteristic of a man, presents many aspects from which it may be viewed:

- (1.) It has a relative significance, being used to encounter, and tacitly to rebuke, rash speaking, and every kind of presumption. It was thus relative to a sophistical and rhetorical period, but has also a universal adaptability under similar circumstances.
- (2.) It indicates a certain moral attitude as being suitable to philosophy, showing that in weakness there is strength.
- (3.) It is a part of good breeding, which by deference holds its own.
- (4.) It is a point of style, a means of avoiding dogmatism.
- (5.) It is an artifice of controversy, inducing an adversary to expose his weakness, maintaining a negative and critical position.
- (6.) It is full of humor, and this humor consists in an intellect-

ual way of dealing with things, in a contrast between the conscious strength of the wise man and the humility of his pretensions, in a teacher coming to be taught, and the learner *naïvely* undertaking to teach.


Such are some of the most striking features in the mien and bearing of Socrates.

STATE THE PROCESSES BY WHICH ARISTOTLE ARRIVES AT THE SUBJECTS OF "THE JUDGMENT" [βούλευσις]

He does this by a series of exclusions, as it were.

(1.) αἵδια. = sets this aside.

(2.) κίνητα.



So the object of βούλευσις = τὰ ἀνθρώπινα of things in our power. Exact science excluded, and τὰ αἰσθητά; then left, "the sphere of things contingent"—"τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ."

HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN AMUSEMENT.

- (1.) Those who say it does consist in amusement are *incompetent judges*, knowing no higher pleasure than amusement. *Children and tyrants* seek it, who have not had a taste of purer happiness [εἰλικρινοῦς — εἴλω = to roll, separate the fine from the impure].

(2.) Amusement is with a view to work, not work with a view to amusement, i. e., it is a "means to work and not an end."

(3.) Amusement has no necessary connection with what is most noble in man (e. g. the *element of σπουδή*).

Happiness is dependent on virtue, which has to do with earnestness, and not amusement [παιδιά].

ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας οὐ πλούσιον οὐδὲ δυνάστην ὑπολαβεῖν τὸν εὐδαίμονα, εἰπὼν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσειεν, εἴ τις ἄτοπος φανείη τοῖς πολλοῖς.

(X. 8. 11.). Anaxagoras thought that the happy man was neither rich nor possessed of political power, and that by holding this view, he might appear absurd to the majority of people. This comes under the chapter of *Secondary Position of Moral Excellence*, under the heading of *A Moderate Degree of External Goods being Necessary for Human Happiness*.

ἐν σχολῇ.

This does not imply leisure in the sense of inactivity, but it means simply that the ἐνέργεια is *uninterrupted*, and goes on *perfectly harmoniously*, without *fatigue* or *effort*.

"An opinion which is universally received, must have some element of truth in it"; it is in accordance with this principle that Aristotle compares his definition of happiness with other popular and philosophical ones in the First Book of the Ethics.

Τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασμένου.

[ὡς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι εἵκαζον.]—Evil of infinite, but good is of the finite. This was the view of the Pythagoreans.

"Good implies a limit, evil does not." (This comes in discussion of mean, just before great definition of Moral Virtue.—II. 6. 14.)

WHEREIN DOES THE EXTREME IMPORTANCE OF THE MORAL
FREEDOM OF MAN CONSIST?

If a man were devoid of *προαίρεσις*, he would be *no more than a beast, or mere machine*; he would have *no hopes or aspirations, no motive for efforts*. His actions would all be determined by causes independent of himself, and he would have *no hopes for the future*.

THE FOUR GREAT αἴτια.

- (1.) φύσις.
- (2.) ἀναγκή = e. g. larger stones underneath in the building of a wall.
- (3.) τύχη.
- (4.) νοῦς.

RELATION OF φρόνησις TO MORAL VIRTUE.

Moral Virtue gives certain general principles, *φρόνησις* teaches one how to apply them.

BK. X. CH. 8. § 3.

N. B. *φρόνησις* is the guiding principle of all the moral virtues ["*συνεζεύκται δὲ καὶ ἡ φρόνησις τῇ τοῦ ἡθους ἀρετῇ*"].

ἐλευθερία.

"*μεσότης περὶ δόσιν καὶ λήψιν χρημάτων.*" *It is more connected with giving than receiving.* = τῆς γὰρ ἀρετῆς τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ τὸ εὖ πάσχειν, καὶ τὰ καλὰ πράττειν, μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ αἰσχρὰ μὴ πράττειν. — *Active and positive*, rather than *passive and negative*. The extremes—*ἀσωτία* and *ἀνελευθερία*—but "*prodigal*" is used in wider sense [*συμπλέκοντες*] applied to the intemperate generally. *Liberality* is that "quality or virtue which enables us to make the best possible use of money."

Liberality is one of the most popular of virtues [*φιλοῦται σχεδὸν μάλιστα*].

Three conditions—

- (1.) A noble motive [*τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα*].
- (2.) Due consideration of the recipients, the amount, and occasion [*τὰλλα ὅσα ἔπεται τῇ ὀρθῇ δόσει*].
- (3.) With cheerfulness [*ἡδέως ἢ ἀλύπως*].

ὁ ἐλευθέριος must not be indifferent to the source from which money comes. He will want it, as a means of giving, and not to secure it for himself. *Liberality* is to be measured, not by the *absolute*, but by the *relative* amount given. *Liberality* is more often found in those who have *inherited*, rather than in those who have made their money. Princes cannot be called prodigal, for their wealth is all but boundless. ὁ ἐλευθέριος is an easy man to have dealings with [*εὐκοινώνητος*]. He will regret more keenly having spent too little, than having spent too much, and he is no friend to 'Simonides' [*οὐκ ἀρεσκόμενος*]. ὁ ἄσωτος is easily cured by age and want [*εὐίατός τε γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἡλικίας καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀπορίας*]; the prodigal rather weak than vicious, for the benefit of others; but the ἀνελευθέριος benefits no one, not even himself. *Illiberality* is incurable [*ἀνίατος*]. It is a more natural vice than *ἀσωτία* [*συμφυέστερον*]; it has many forms [*πολυειδές*]. It does not come in "completeness" [*ὀλόκληρος*—Ch. iv. 5. 7.] to everybody. "*ἀνελευθερία*" is more opposed to "*ἐλευθερία*" than "*ἀσωτία*."

INSTANCES OF EXTREMES BEING SUBDIVIDED.

Excess.	Mean.	Excess.
θρασύς } ἄφοβος } ἀνδρείος δειλός.
ἄρεσκος } κόλαξ } φίλος	{ δύσερις δύσκολος.

φθόνος = is the feeling of pain at other people's prosperity.

νέμεσις = righteous indignation at the undeserved success of our neighbors [*πέλας*].

ἐπιχαιρεκακία = is the feeling pleasure at the wrong persons prospering.

δικαιοσύνη =

- (1.) Covers the whole field of virtues.
- (2.) Fair dealing in matters of money or business.

THE IDEA OF SELF-SACRIFICE IN ARISTOTLE.

The surrender of one's life to the State, in the exercise of the best form of courage.

Humility = The avoidance of any exaggerated claim to knowledge or power; underrating oneself not humility.

Aristotle's *μεγαλόψυχος* seems to be satisfied with himself, whereas the Christian must feel that he comes very far short of his ideal.

μεγαλοπρέπεια = is more a Greek notion than one which would be consistent with our modern ideas.

Aristotle's social virtues, e. g. *φιλία*, *ἀλήθεια*, *εὐτραπεία*, a modern moralist would not elevate to such a high position.

Vengeance =

- III. 5. 7. *τιμωρία*—vengeance, not with a view to reforming a character. Legislators *τιμωροῦνται* evil-doers.
- III. 8. 12. When taking vengeance—*ῥδονται*, when angry, pained.
- IV. 5. 12. *ἀνθρωπικώτερον γὰρ τὸ τιμωρεῖσθαι*. In describing the bad-tempered—*χαλεποί*.

ORDER OF ARRANGEMENT IN TABLE OF VIRTUES.

- (1.) From *elementary to complex*.
- (2.) In *order of time*. From those which are *developed early in life* to those which come *later in life*.

(3.) From *lower to higher*, that is, with regard to the *rational part* of our nature.

(4.) From the *more purely self-regarding* to those which have *reference to others*.

Four cardinal virtues of Plato:

1. Courage.
2. Temperance.
3. Wisdom.
4. Justice.

σκοπεῖν δὴ τὰ προειρημένα χρὴ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὸν βίον ἐπιφέροντας, καὶ συναδόντων μὲν τοῖς ἔργοις ἀποδεκτέον, διαφωνούντων δὲ λόγους ὑποληπτέον. (Bk. X. Ch. 8. § 22.)

Secondary position of moral excellence. Practical experience is the highest tribunal; the authority of wise men is subordinate to it. For man, continuous activity of the intellect is a practical impossibility. One must have a moderate amount of external goods. The *last appeal must be to facts*, and to the *practical experience of life* [in describing the intellectual and contemplative life].

"IDEA OF 'INVOLVEDNESS.'"

οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε ἢ οὐ ῥάδιον τὰ ἐκ παλαιοῦ τοῖς ἡθεσι κατειλημμένα λόγῳ μεταστῆσαι. (Bk. X. 9. 5.)

Cannot change, by reasoning, those who never have experienced true pleasures [*ἄγευστοι ὄντες*]. Moral theories have no influence except on those already fitted to receive them. (Bk. X., importance of education.)

Χαλεπὸν ἀποτρίψασθαι πάθος ἐγκλωσμένον τῷ βίῳ. (Bk. II. 3. 8.) Referring here to pleasure, when Aristotle speaks of "virtue as being connected with pleasure and pain."

"*Ενία γὰρ εὐθὺς ὠνόμασται συνειλημμένα μετὰ τῆς φαυλότητος.* (Bk. II. 6. 18.) (e. g. *ἐπιχαιρεκακία*, *κλοπή*.) "For some things involve the notion of badness directly they are mentioned."

When Aristotle is talking of "virtue being a mean state," one must not suppose that, because virtue consists in moderation, a moderate amount of all things under the sun is good. Because it is moderate in things bad in themselves, the right amount is not a moderate amount, but no amount at all.

WHY IS IT THAT A CHANGE FOR THE WORSE IN THE MORAL CHARACTER OF AN INDIVIDUAL DOES NOT LESSEN HIS RESPONSIBILITY? (Bk. III. Ch. 5. § 10.)

Character is the *result of single acts*, for which he is responsible. A change for the worse is the result of single acts, and for each of these *single acts* he is *responsible*, therefore he is responsible for the *result* as well. A man is bound to know that a change would follow from the acts.

ARGUMENTS WHICH TURN UPON THE MEANING OF WORDS,
I. E. ETYMOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS.

- (1.) ἀκόλαστος=unchastised.
- (2.) ἄσωτος=in light of suicide—wastes his οὐσία (substance). Cf. also essence—τί ἦν εἶναι.
- (3.) προαίρεσις=πρὸ ἐτέρων αἵρετόν.
- (4.) ἔθος and ἥθος=bundle of ἔθη makes an ἥθος—cf. mos, mores.


πάθη and *πράξεις* are the *raw materials*, which are to virtues as food to bodily strength.

αιδώς.

Sense of shame, or fear of disgrace. It resembles the fear of danger; but in the former men grow red [ἐρυθραίνονται], and in the latter pale [ὠχρίῳσιν].

We praise modest youths, but no one will praise an *old man* for being shamefaced [*αἰσχυντηλός*], because he ought not to do anything of which he will feel ashamed. It is absurd to say that a man is good because he would feel shame if he were to do an unworthy action. ["εἰ γὰρ πράξει, αἰσχύνοι' ἄν."]

Shame is only hypothetically [ἐξ ὑποθέσεως] a virtue.



AMBITION, OR HONOR ON A SMALL SCALE.

The mean connected with this is nameless, for sometimes we praise the love of honor as being manly, and sometimes the man who does not love honor [*ἀφιλότιμος*] as being a man of moderation [*μέτριος*] and of self-control [*σώφρων*].

Since, then, the middle place is vacant, the extremes contend for it.

“Ἀνωρύμου δ’ οὔσης τῆς μεσότητος ὡς ἐρήμης ἔοικεν ἀμφισβητεῖν τὰ ἄκρα.” (Cf. too, simile of favorite dish.)

THE VARIETIES OF ὀργιλότης ARE:

- (1.) ὀργίλοι=*passionate* [παύονται δὲ ταχέως]. They retaliate openly [ἀνταποδιδόασιν, ἢ φανεροί εἰσι], which is the best point they have [ὁ καὶ βέλτιστον ἔχουσιν].
- (2.) ἀκρόχολοι=*quick-tempered* [ὀργίλοι πρὸς πᾶν καὶ ἐπὶ παντί].
- (3.) πικροί=*sulky*. Keep anger for a long time, and are only content when they have obtained revenge. δυσδιάλυτοι=*hard to reconcile*. ἐν αὐτῷ δὲ πέσαι τὴν ὀργὴν χρόνου δεῖ.
- (4.) χάλεποι=*ill-tempered*—disagreeable to live with [πρὸς τὸ συμβιοῦν].

It is not easy to decide about our anger in all cases, as the decision in particular instances must depend upon our moral sense [*τῇ αἰσθήσει ἢ κρίσει*]. Cf. St. Paul, "Be angry, and sin not."

- I. *σώφρων* = the man in whom *virtue has become a habit*—bad desires are conquered—no struggle.
- II. *ἐγκρατής* = one who has a struggle between good and bad desires, and *acts rightly*.
- III. *ἀκρατής* = one who has a struggle between good and bad desires, but *acts wrongly*.
- IV. *ἀκόλαστος* = one in whom *vice has become a habit*. The desire of good is eradicated. He does wrong without a struggle.

ὁ μεγαλόψυχος.

- (1.) Must be a good man.
- (2.) Generally supercilious—*ὑπερόπτης*—[thought to be].
- (3.) Open in his friendships and hatreds [*φανερόμισος καὶ φανερόφιλος*].
- (4.) His aim is honor on a great scale.
- (5.) Discriminating in honor paid him; will receive it, because nothing better to give.
- (6.) Neither shuns nor courts danger [*μικροκίνδυνος οὐδὲ φιλοκίνδυνος*].
- (7.) Loves to confer, is ashamed to receive benefits.
- (8.) Asks no favors—does not go in search of honor.
- (9.) Cares more for truth than opinion—no gossip [*ἀνθρωπολόγος*].
- (10.) Not apt to admire, for nothing is great to him.
- (11.) Does not recollect injuries.
- (12.) Not anxious about trifles.
- (13.) Possesses what is grand and unproductive, rather than what is useful.

TWO KINDS OF ILLIBERALITY.

- (1.) Those who do not give where they ought—
e. g. *φειδωλοί* (sparing).
γλίσχροι (stingy).
κίμβικες (niggardly).
κυμνοπρίστης (skinflint).
- (2.) Those who gain whence they ought not—
e. g. *τοκισταί* (usurers).
κυβεύτης (gamester).
λωποδύτης (clothes-stealer).

ὁ μεγαλοπρέπης.

The magnificent (or *munificent*) man, in cases of private expenses, spends money on such occasions as occur only once [*εἰσάπαξ*]; e. g. a marriage (*γάμος*). His home is furnished suitably to his wealth — "*οἶκον κατασκευάσασθαι πρεπόντως τῷ πλούτῳ*." He differs from the liberal man in largeness of sums which he deals with — "*πολλάκι δόσκον ἀλήτην*."

σωφροσύνη.

Temperance [*σωφροσύνη*] is concerned with *pleasures and pains*, but more especially with the *pleasures*. These are of two kinds: (1.) Those of the *body* [*σώματος*]; (2.) Those of the *soul* [*ψυχῆς*]. With pleasures of the soul, temperance has nothing to do, nor is it connected with all the bodily ones, only indirectly connected with *smell, hearing, and sight*. *Temperance*, therefore, has especially to do with *touch and taste*, and most of all with *touch*. (Cf.) This proceeds from a false physical theory of Aristotle's, that the *pleasure of eating lay in the contact of food with the œsophagus*—

διὸ καὶ ἡὔξατό τις, ὀφοφάγος (Philoxenus) ὦν τὸν φάρυγγα αὐτῷ μακρότερον γεράνου γενέσθαι, ὥς ἡδόμενος τῇ ἀφῇ.

But the nobler pleasures of the touch, e. g. *rubbing in the gymnasium*, are distinct from this.

ἀκόλαστος.

This is a metaphor derived from a child who has not been properly chastised. The desire of what is pleasant develops itself greatly, unless it is (chastised) curbed. The *appetitive part* must be under the *sway of reason*, as a child is under the authority of a teacher.

This is the man in whom vice has become a habit, and the desire of good is eradicated; he does wrong without a struggle.

IN ANY DELIBERATE ACTION THE FOLLOWING STEPS MAY BE TAKEN.

- (1.) βούλησις = desire, or wish, for some end to be obtained.
- (2.) βούλευσις = deliberation on the several means by which this end may be obtained.
- (3.) προαίρεσις = deliberate choice of some one means, or series of means, as the most eligible.

After this *πρᾶξις* follows.

ἵκανός γὰρ καὶ ἐν ἐγκυκλίῳ εἴρηται περὶ αὐτῶν.

(Bk. I. 5. 6.). In considering some of the theories as to the nature of happiness. *Is it virtue?*

λέγεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις ἀρκούντως ἔνια, καὶ χρηστέον αὐτοῖς.

(Bk. I. 13. 9.). In speaking of the *twofold division of the soul* into the rational and irrational, "popular treatises will suffice."

ARISTOTLE DIVIDES THE PROCESSES OF THE SOUL INTO THESE THREE:

- (1.) πάθος = process on which follows pleasure or pain: e. g. fear.
- (2.) δύναμις = is the faculty of having these feelings.
- (3.) ἔξις = is the permanent relation in which we stand towards the πάθη.

ἔργον.

- (1.) The proper function of anything, or the using of the highest part of it: e. g. the *ἔργον* of the soul is the using of νοῦς.
- (2.) Result produced.
- (3.) Something difficult.

"Ἴν' ἀγαθοὶ γενώμεθα. ARE THERE ANY PRACTICAL RULES GIVEN FOR THIS PURPOSE?

Aristotle enlarges on the indefiniteness of the general principles of morals and application in particular cases; they fall under no *τεχνή* or *παραγγελία*, i. e. no practical set of rules.

- (1.) To become good, do good actions [habituation].
- (2.) Good education from youth [this to make others good].
 - (a.) Avoid worse extreme.
 - (b.) Avoid extreme to which you are most liable.
 - (c.) Be on your guard against pleasure.

But the question of practical rules is really the question of politics and not of Ethics.

UNDER HEAD OF Προαίρεσις.

We are *responsible* for all *voluntary* actions, which we do without *προαίρεσις*; i. e. without going through a process of deliberation and choice: e. g. actions done on the "spur of the moment" [*τὰ ἐξαίφνης*]; whether from anger, desire, or any other motive.

"VIRTUE IS ONLY VICE A LITTLE EXAGGERATED OR A LITTLE CONTROLLED." PROVE FROM ARISTOTLE THAT THIS IS A MISREPRESENTATION OF HIS THEORY OF THE MEAN.

This misrepresents Aristotle's theory, because virtue is the right regulation, not of a vice, but of some feeling (or action) which in itself is neither good nor bad. It is good when you have the feeling in right amount, on right occasions, etc., bad when you

have it in excess or defect. But no diminution or exaggeration of a vice will make it a virtue; you diminish or exaggerate the feeling (e. g., confidence or fear, to make courage).

FOUR KINDS OF ἀρχαί.

e. g. statue.

- (1.) The material.....marble
- (2.) The efficient.....artist
- (3.) The formal.....design in artist's mind
- (4.) The finalpurpose or end for which he intended it.

Ψυχή.

Comprises (of man)—

- (1.) The principle of life.
- (2.) The emotional nature.
- (3.) The rational nature.

THREE WAYS OF ARRIVING AT Ἀρχαί.

- (1.) ἐπαγωγή=induction—e. g. *chemistry*.
- (2.) αἰσθήσει=perception—e. g. *axioms*.
- (3.) ἐθισμῶ=habituation—e. g. *moral principles*.

ONE DOES NOT FEEL PLEASURE IN EVERY VIRTUE.

e. g. One does not feel pleasure in courage, except so far as the attainment of the end and ideal of his being is felt and realized [πλὴν ἐφ' ὅσον τοῦ τέλους ἐφάπτεται], because there is an element of pain in it; so that we do not *energize pleasantly* [τὸ ἡδέως ἐνεργεῖν]. Nor need we deny that a more reckless, though less brave man, might perhaps make a better *rank-and-file* soldier.

Στρατιώτας δ' οὐδὲν ἴσως κωλύει μὴ τοὺς τοιοῦτους κρατίστους εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἥτιον μὲν ἀνδρείους. ἄλλο δ' ἀγαθὸν μηδὲν ἔχοντας.

Under discussion of "How can courage, which involves pain and loss, have a *pleasure in itself*?"

THERE IS SOME GREAT END.

For if there were no great final end, then we should have certain desires, with no object to fulfil them. This cannot be, because οὐδὲν φύσει ματὴν.

EXAMPLES OF παρέργα.

- (1.) That happiness comes from gods [ἄλλη σκέψις].
- (2.) Solon's dictum (part of it)—*τυχαί*.
- (3.) Division of soul.
- (4.) The difference between praise and encomium.

ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις.

Decision in moral questions rests with moral sense, or perception. This occurs when Aristotle is saying that it is hard to say *at what point an action begins to be wrong* (Bk. IV. 5.—ὀργιλότης); how far a man may go without being ψέκτος. Cannot lay down a rule.

αἴσθησις will guide him: ὀρθὸς λόγος gives general rules: αἴσθησις applies them to particular cases.

Cf. also in connection with rules for attaining the mean, Bk. II. 9. (Rules for Mean).

MAN'S ἔργον.

(Vide process by which Aristotle arrives at his Definition of Happiness.)

Every part of us has got something to do: e. g. eye=seeing.

The parts of a man have an ἔργον. So he, *qua* man, must have one.

Not mere living, not a life of sensation or growth, but ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς κατὰ λόγον. If this is his ἔργον, his happiness will be to have it in the best manner [ἀρίστην]; but that will require time. So ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ is added, which covers the idea of external goods as well.

